

NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

TIME, MAY 27, 1974

WATERGATE

The President Resolves to Fight

"I am not guilty of any offense under the Constitution that is called an impeachable offense."

So said Richard Nixon last week as both he and the U.S. Congress dug in for a long and fierce struggle over whether the President should be removed from office. At the White House, Nixon told Conservative Columnist James J. Kilpatrick in a rare interview that after "long thought," he had resolved not to resign "under any circumstances." Moreover, he ruled out "the rather fatuous suggestion that I take the 25th Amendment and just step out and have Vice President Ford step in for a while."

If impeached by the House, Nixon said he would "accept the verdict in good grace." But he promised a vigorous defense during the Senate trial that would follow. He explained: "I would do it for the reasons that are not—what do you call it—those of the toreador in the ring trying to prove himself; but I would do it because I have given long thought to what is best for the country, our system of Government and the constitutional process." Nixon believes that the removal of an innocent President through either "resignation or impeachment would have the traumatic effect of destroying [the nation's] sense of stability and leadership . . . I will not be a party under any circumstances to any action which would set that kind of precedent."

Resignation Benefits. The interview, which was requested by Nixon, was the first he has permitted in his second term as President (see story page 16). The unusual way that he chose to declare his determination signified the urgency he placed on stilling the rumors of his imminent resignation. They have whirled about the White House since he released edited transcripts of 46 tape-recorded Watergate conversations with his aides.

Similarly, on Capitol Hill last week, Democratic and Republican leaders alike tried to quell rank-and-file congressional demands that Nixon step down and save the nation the trauma of impeachment and trial. Senate Democratic Whip Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia warned that a forced resignation would polarize the nation. "A significant portion of our citizens would feel that the President had been driven from office by his political enemies," he said. "The question of guilt or innocence would never be fully resolved." Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield declared that "resignation is not the answer." House Speaker Carl Albert advised that it was preferable "for the constitutional process to run its course."

The Democratic leaders may well have been sincere in their statements against resignation, though in private they did not convincingly deny that they would be greatly relieved if Nixon did step down. In fact, House leaders even ordered staff members to examine resignation's possible financial benefits to Nixon. They found that if he were re-

moved from office by conviction in the Senate, he would get a pension of only about \$12,000 a year, due to him because of his 18 years' Government service as a Naval officer, Congressman and Vice President. If he left voluntarily, he would also get the normal presidential pension of \$60,000 a year, plus up to \$96,000 annually to maintain a staff and office. But the overt Democratic strategy has been to act as statesmen, avoid obvious partisanship and leave talk of resignation to the Republicans.

G.O.P. leaders, however, were having no part of it. Although none defended Nixon's conduct, they clearly had decided against asking Nixon to resign despite their outrage over the tawdry portrait of his presidency revealed by the transcripts. Tennessee Senator William Brock, chairman of the Republican Senate Campaign Committee, said that Nixon has a right to a Senate trial "if he wants it, which he seems to." Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania added: "I think our nation is strong enough to withstand the functioning of its own Constitution." The Republican leaders doubtless also had in mind the possibility that Nixon could be acquitted. White House Speechwriter Patrick Buchanan warned that if Republicans forced Nixon out of office and he were later found to be innocent of wrongdoing, it "would be close to fatal for the Republican Party."

Pleading Guilty. As the pressure for resignation eased, Nixon's men kept walking into Washington courtrooms to face justice. Dwight L. Chapin, 33, once the President's appointments secretary, was given a term of 10 to 30 months for lying to a federal grand jury about his role in directing Donald Segretti, the political dirty trickster of Nixon's 1972 campaign. Chapin said that he would appeal his case to the Supreme Court if need be. (Chapin is the fifth former White House aide or consultant to be sentenced to jail. Three others—John W. Dean III, Frederick LaRue and Jeb Stuart Magruder—have pleaded guilty to taking part in the Watergate cover-up and are awaiting sentencing.)

A day later Richard Kleindienst, 50, the former U.S. Attorney General, pleaded guilty to the charge of a misdemeanor stemming from his confirmation hearings, which were conducted by the Senate Judiciary Committee. In effect Kleindienst admitted that he had not been completely candid when he testified that as Deputy Attorney General, he had not been pressured by the White House to drop an antitrust case against the International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., which was to pledge up to \$400,000 to the G.O.P. In fact, the President himself had given Kleindienst such an order (which Kleindienst refused to carry out), saying: "You son of a bitch, don't you understand the English language?"

Kleindienst, who could be sent to jail for as long as a year but may get a suspended sentence, is only the second

convicted of a crime. (In 1929 Albert Fall, President Warren G. Harding's Secretary of the Interior, was given one year for bribery in the Teapot Dome scandal.) Watergate Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski agreed to let Kleindienst plead guilty to a misdemeanor, in part because the former Attorney General had cooperated with the investigation of the ITT affair.

In the House, the Judiciary Committee's impeachment inquiry seemed to be moving more slowly last week than originally expected. Chairman Peter Rodino planned to hold the first televised public session this week. But it appears the week will again be spent behind closed doors as the committee continues to hear evidence accumulated by the staff in its investigation of 41 allegations of wrongdoing by the President. Last week the staff presented evidence on the Watergate cover-up and how \$450,000 in funds from Nixon's reelection campaign was paid as "hush money" to the seven original Watergate conspirators. This week the committee will hear about Nixon's taxes, campaign financing and campaign "dirty tricks." At the earliest, the public phase of the hearings may not begin until next week.

Even though the committee members had promised to keep the staff evidence confidential, excerpts of its transcript of a Sept. 15, 1972 conversation between Nixon and two top aides leaked. In a letter to Rodino, Presidential Attorney James St. Clair protested that the leaks were "prejudicing the basic right of the President to an impartial inquiry on the evidence." St. Clair demanded that all further proceedings be conducted in public "so that the American people can be fully informed with regard to all the evidence presented." Rodino recommended instead that Nixon release all the Watergate-related tapes and other documents that he has refused to yield to the committee and Jaworski.

The leaked excerpts contained material deleted as irrelevant from the White House transcript of the Sept. 15 meeting. Although the omitted passages offered no new evidence of Nixon's guilt or innocence, one of them did provide a fresh example of his vindictiveness. In it the President said that the Washington Post, which was vigorously investigating the Watergate scandal, would have "damnable, damnable problems" in renewing the licenses of two television stations that it controls. Nixon also said of Attorney Edward Bennett Williams, who was representing both the Post and the Democratic National Committee at the time: "We're going to fix that son of a bitch."

Relevant Conversations. The committee sent two new subpoenas to the President. One demanded eleven tapes of his conversations with aides on April 4, June 20 and June 23, 1972. Special Counsel John Doar said the tapes are needed to determine if Nixon had prior knowledge of the break-in at the Democratic National Headquarters on June 17, 1972, and if he participated in the beginning of the cover-up the following week.

The second subpoena demanded the President's daily schedules from April to July 1972, when the break-in was planned and executed; from February

to April 1973, when the cover-up was unraveling; from July 12 to July 31, 1973, when it was disclosed that presidential conversations were taped; and from October 1973, when Nixon fired Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. Doar said the committee needed the logs to determine whether there were other conversations relevant to Watergate that should be requested. Nixon seemed unlikely to comply with the subpoenas; the deadlines are this Wednesday. St. Clair once more contended that Nixon's already released transcripts provided all the evidence needed to establish his role in Watergate.

Many constitutional experts believe that Nixon has no right to refuse the Judiciary Committee's subpoenas. In an article published by the *Yale Law Journal* last week, Harvard Law Fellow Raul Berger called the President's claim that the material is protected by Executive privilege an "extraordinary spectacle . . . [that] stands history on its head." He also attacked St. Clair's argument to the Judiciary Committee that Nixon can be impeached only for indictable offenses. Berger called it "a pastiche of selected snippets and half-truths, exhibiting a resolute disregard of adverse facts." He went on to say that both Nixon and St. Clair disregard the fact that the framers of the Constitution saw impeachment as an exception to the doctrine of separation of powers and carefully made impeachment "both limited and noncriminal." Of St. Clair, Berger concluded: "He is not so much engaged in honest reconstruction of history as in propaganda whose sole purpose is to influence public opinion."

Timetable for Trial. In another dispute over Watergate evidence, Federal Judge John J. Sirico took under advisement White House lawyers' pleas against surrendering 64 presidential tapes to Prosecutor Jaworski. The President contends that Jaworski has not demonstrated that he needs the material. Among the tapes sought are three of conversations between Nixon and former Special Counsel Charles Colson on June 20, 1972, just three days after the Watergate break-in. The prosecutors hope that tapes of the conversations will shed some light on two other presidential conversations held the same day: one with former Chief of Staff H.R. Halde- man, which was partially obliterated by an 18½-minute mysterious buzz; the other with former Attorney General and Campaign Director John Mitchell, which presidential aides claim was never taped. The prosecutors believe the tapes may also explain why Nixon could not shake the fear, as he put it on April 15, 1973, that Colson was "up to his navel" in the Watergate affair. Colson has specifically denied any involvement in the break-in.

With a presidential resignation no longer a serious option, many in the Congress and elsewhere in Washington figure that impeachment by the House is a foregone conclusion, though it is far too early to predict the outcome of the

An Error of Transcription: "Bah" or "ACT"?

While recovering from a slipped disc, Municipal Bond Trader John B. Northrop (*right*) of Huntington, N.Y., spent four days carefully reading President Nixon's Watergate transcripts—and discovered a rather sloppy error. His find drew an admission from the White House last week that two typists had independently transcribed the same portion of a meeting between the President (P) and Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen (HP) on April 16, 1973. The overlap slipped by, and the two versions appeared in tandem in the published transcript as separate conversations. The error was not caught sooner because the versions differ so markedly, underscoring the House Judiciary Committee's argument that only the tapes will suffice as evidence in its impeachment inquiry. Comparisons of parts of the two versions:



FIRST VERSION

HP: Personally [inaudible], well, I've been [inaudible] and have advised the Jury of that fact and two that [Acting FBI Director L. Patrick] Groy, from what [former U.S. Attorney Harold H.] Titus who has [inaudible] of the [inaudible] over there has to go to see Sirico.

P: I don't think [inaudible] that's [inaudible].

HP: That's [inaudible]. I don't think he will do anything unless it's in the current [inaudible] of proceeding he's in [inaudible]. I can't conceive a point which of Titus and—if there.

P: This timing thing I think is terribly important—you know.

HP: I think it is.

P: Can't have the President—after all—after all these months and what we've gone through and now once I have learned something of it I say "bah."

SECOND VERSION

HP: [Inaudible] question. [Inaudible] I told him one, I would be willing to go [inaudible] and advise his lawyers of that fact and, two, that they—and by that I mean Titus who has the best relationship with Sirico over there—is going to have to wait and see Sirico, oh—

P: [Inaudible].

HP: That's a problem. That's a risk we would have to take. I don't think he will. I don't think he will do anything unless it is the context of a proceeding in his court. I can't conceive of him urging the [inaudible] of Titus and [inaudible].

P: [Inaudible] timing on this is terribly important you know, because

HP: I understand it is.

P: You can't have the press—after all these months and what we have gone through and all. Once, I find something out—I say—ACTI

Senate trial. To speed up the process, Democratic House leaders plan to pass the remaining appropriations bills before July 1, thus allowing the Representatives to give complete attention to impeachment. The leaders' current timetable calls for the House Judiciary Committee to finish its investigation by the end of June and if it votes an impeachment resolution as expected, for the full House to vote on the matter by July 31. If articles of impeachment are approved, Nixon will be given a month to plan his defense, enabling the Senate to begin the trial by Sept. 3—the day after Labor Day. Although the Senators will meet six days a week with no recess for the fall campaigns, the leaders are not certain a verdict can be reached by Election Day, Nov. 5. At all costs, they want to keep the trial from going on into next year, when the 93rd Congress expires and the 94th begins. If that happens, some congressional experts believe that the impeachment process might have to start all over again, an unthinkable prospect.

TIME, JUNE 3, 1974

Nixon: No, No, a Thousand Times No

Facing demands for Watergate-related White House evidence on three fronts, President Nixon last week hung tough, adamant and defiant. He flouted the constitutionally sanctioned impeachment process by informing the House Judiciary Committee that he will ignore all pending and future subpoenas for White House tapes and documents. He directed his attorneys to appeal Federal Judge John J. Sirica's succinct ruling that Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski's subpoenas for 64 tape recordings are legally binding upon the President. He took legal action to kill court-sanctioned subpoenas for White House files from two defendants in the impending Daniel Ellsberg burglary trial, thereby advancing the possibility that charges against two of his former aides, John Ehrlichman and Charles Colson, may have to be dismissed.

Nixon's strategy of stone-walling all subpoenas carried at least one clear inference, based on both longstanding legal precepts and simple logic. By publicly releasing the edited transcripts of 46 Watergate conversations, Nixon had presented his own best evidentiary case against impeachment; damning as those documents may prove, the material he is now withholding must be even worse. Nixon is apparently gambling that his refusal to deliver such evidence will be seen in the end as a somewhat technical procedural matter carrying less danger of impeachment and conviction than would the contents of the material itself if yielded.

To be sure, the President couched his subpoena rejections in terms of principle rather than in the concrete concerns of survival. The three objects of his defiance:

I. THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY.

Although the President's decision to choke off any further turnover of White House tapes or documents to Chairman Peter Rodino's impeachment committee had been signaled clearly by Presidential Defense Counsel James St. Clair, Nixon's formal declaration carried a ring of finality. Feigning ignorance of the purpose of two subpoenas issued by the committee on May 15, Nixon wrote Rodino that "I can only presume that the material sought must be thought to relate in some unspecified way to what has generally been known as 'Watergate.'" Nixon noted his counsel's reports that the committee may issue more subpoenas and termed this "a never-ending process" that would "constitute such a massive invasion into the confidentiality of presidential conversations that the institution of the presidency itself would be fatally compromised."

To yield more tapes, Nixon also argued, would merely "prolong the impeachment inquiry without yielding significant additional evidence." Therefore, he concluded, he would decline to produce tapes and presidential diaries already subpoenaed and would similarly refuse to obey all subpoenas "allegedly dealing with Watergate" that "may hereafter be issued."

The Nixon letter ignored the solid legal argument, affirmed by at least six past Presidents, that the doctrine of Executive privilege to withhold presidential

conversations with aides is not applicable to an impeachment proceeding. Constitutionally, impeachment is the ultimate check upon the Executive Branch by the Legislative and necessarily breaches the normal separation of powers between the two. Moreover, since Nixon had waived confidentiality for the 46 conversations of which he had released 1,254 pages of transcripts on April 30, his reassertion of confidentiality now seemed both inconsistent and arbitrary. Once again, Nixon was attempting to dictate to the committee what evidence was relevant to his own possible impeachment; no principle of U.S. law permits a potential defendant to make such a decision.

The President at the same time directed St. Clair to reject a Rodino committee request for 66 tapes or documents related to two other areas of its inquiry: Nixon's role in the Government's settlement of antitrust suits against ITT in 1972 and in the Administration's raising of milk-support prices in 1971. Both actions followed promises of financial support by ITT and milk producers to the Nixon re-election effort. St. Clair noted in two letters to the Judiciary Committee's chief counsel, John Doar, that "voluminous" material had already been supplied to the committee on both topics. He promised only that the tape of one conversation on the ITT matter would be "reviewed" and that a transcript of "the pertinent portion thereof, if any," would be furnished.

Although anticipated, the Nixon-St. Clair cutoff clearly angered many members of the Judiciary Committee. Speaking for the committee, Rodino called the rejection "a very grave matter" and implied that it will be taken into consideration as a possible impeachable offense. The committee's second-ranking Republican, Robert McClory of Illinois, termed Nixon's decision "very unfortunate. It hurts him with the committee. We were very specific and justified each request." The committee's frustrating problem is that it has no practical way to force the President to relinquish the evidence withheld.

After listening last week to more of the tapes acquired from the White House and the Watergate grand jury, committee members found numerous inconsistencies with the White House transcripts. Rodino complained that the transcripts omitted words and sentences of conversations and changed some wording from that clearly audible on the tapes. Further, the White House had attributed statements to the wrong people and even added words not on the tapes. "This is a very unsatisfactory kind of evidence," protested Doar. Added Albert Jenner, the committee's Republican counsel: "Even in a routine civil case, secondary evidence such as this is not acceptable until every avenue for the best evidence has been exhausted."

Despite the imperfections in the transcripts, the committee members seemed in general agreement that they had heard the most damaging evidence in the two weeks of closed review of material assembled by their staff. They heard the celebrated March 21 tape of Nixon's discussion with John Doar, his former counsel, about paying mon-

ey to keep Watergate Burglar E. Howard Hunt from talking about all his White House "plumber" activities. The tape convinced most listeners willing to discuss it that Nixon had clearly ordered Doar to make a payment to Hunt to "buy time," even if such blackmail would be impractical in the long run. Nixon was variously quoted as saying about the hush money: "For Christ's sake, get it" or "Jesus Christ, get it" or "Goddammit, get it." There was little doubt that the explosive emphasized Nixon's command; his statement was neither a question nor a devil's-advocate exploration of options.

II. THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR.

Nixon's refusal to comply with more subpoenas from Prosecutor Jaworski also poses dire risks for him. Unlike those of the Judiciary Committee, Jaworski's demands for evidence are undisputably confined to criminal matters and are moving through the clear-cut channels of the judicial process. This means that in all probability, the dispute will end in a Supreme Court decision to either quash the subpoenas or order Nixon to honor them. The latter seems the most likely result, and any refusal by Nixon to obey the highest court would make impeachment all but certain. But the White House strategy could be based on the sluggishness of the appeals process and the belief that any order to produce the tapes would come after the impeachment debate and possible Senate trial have run their course.

Jaworski wants the tapes both to prepare for the prosecution of the seven former Nixon men indicted in the Watergate cover-up and, as required by law, to supply the defendants with any Government-held exculpatory evidence that might aid their defense. Sirica brusquely dismissed St. Clair's claim that the courts have no power to rule on Executive privilege and must honor such confidentiality whenever it is invoked by a President. Sirica noted that he had been sustained by an appeals court last year when he rejected that same argument after Archibald Cox, Jaworski's fired predecessor, had subpoenaed Nixon tapes. Sirica ruled that the contention thus "was without legal force." The appeals court had added in its decision that "not even the President is above the law."

Sirica's decision revealed that this time, however, the White House had raised a new objection, not one used in the Cox case. Sirica wrote that St. Clair had argued that the courts lacked jurisdiction to enforce the subpoena because the dispute was an "intra-branch controversy wholly within the jurisdiction of the Executive Branch to resolve." While Sirica conceded that such an argument might apply to a dispute between a President and his Cabinet members, he ruled that it did not apply to Jaworski because "the special prosecutor's independence has been affirmed and reaffirmed by the President and his representatives." Sirica decided that Jaworski had specifically been granted the right to challenge assertions of Executive privilege in court and that the contrary argument by St. Clair that Jaworski lacked legal standing to do so was

therefore "a nullity."

The use of that argument by St. Clair obviously infuriated the outwardly affable but tough-minded Jaworski. He dispatched a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee complaining that St. Clair was now challenging his right to take the President to court, and this could "make a farce of the special prosecutor's charter." Nixon's top aide, Alexander Haig, had assured him he would have that authority. Jaworski wrote, as had Attorney General William Saxbe when questioned about this by members of the Senate Judiciary Committee during his confirmation hearings. Nixon had asserted that Jaworski would be given "total cooperation from the Executive Branch," but had not publicly conceded that the prosecutor could challenge him in court. Strictly as a legal matter, rather than one of promises and honor, some lawyers see validity to St. Clair's argument.

The Senate Judiciary Committee promptly backed Jaworski's position. It voted to support Jaworski's right to pursue the Nixon tapes in court. The committee also wrote to Saxbe, urging him to "use all reasonable and appropriate means to guarantee the independence" of the special prosecutor.

On Friday St. Clair met Sirica's deadline for filing an appeal. But Jaworski, moving quickly to speed up the process, directly petitioned the Supreme Court to decide the key issue without waiting for an appeals court ruling. He requested the court to hold a hearing and render its decision before its court term expires in June.

III. THE ELLSBERG BURGLARY CASE.

Nixon's refusal to supply White House documents subpoenaed by two of his most influential former aides, Ehrlichman and Colson, could work to their great personal advantage. Federal Judge

Gerhard Gesell had ruled that they were entitled to the material as part of their defense against charges of having conspired to deprive Los Angeles Psychiatrist Lewis Fielding of his civil rights in the 1971 burglary of his office. The break-in was carried out by Nixon's team of White House plumbers in an effort to gain information on Pentagon Papers Defendant Daniel Ellsberg, who had consulted Fielding.

As a Friday deadline for delivering the documents arrived, St. Clair instead presented a motion to quash the two subpoenas. It included a formal claim of Executive privilege, signed by Nixon, which contended that the information sought by the defendants was confidential and that its disclosure "would be contrary to the public interest and detrimental to the national security."

Openly disturbed at Nixon's action, Judge Gesell lectured St. Clair. "When the Government brings a lawsuit, it must produce the relevant and material evidence it has or drop the suit." Then he pointed out the uniqueness of the situation. "We've got a very special problem here. We've got two governments. There's the special-prosecutor Government, and then there's the people in the other Government that he's trying to prosecute." And Gesell cut caustically to the core of the matter. "We're getting down to the basic question of what the President considers his duty to enforce the criminal laws to be."

No Privilege. When St. Clair weakly offered to let Colson and Ehrlichman look through their personal papers at the White House and select exculpatory material, Gesell bristled. "You mean the defendants could take what they wanted and leave behind things that might incriminate them? What kind of a lawsuit do you think this is, Mr. St. Clair? We can't have a system where a defen-

dant is in charge of selecting the material to be used against himself. I want those documents produced."

Perspiring, St. Clair demurred. "I have no authority, at this time, to agree to waive [Executive] privilege." Snapped Gesell: "There is no privilege, Mr. St. Clair. We're preparing for a trial. The Government has the option of disclosing all information known to it or dismissing the suit." St. Clair contended that there was no precedent for any ruling that the Government must waive all claims of privilege when it prosecutes someone. Gesell promptly ticked off half a dozen cases and added: "These are simply a few handy cases that come to mind. There must be 40 to 80 others."

"I'm interested in a fair trial," Gesell declared. "So is the President," replied St. Clair. Said the judge: "I'd like evidence of that by his producing these relevant documents."

Sustaining his worst tongue-lashing yet as Nixon's defender, St. Clair then absorbed a Gesell lecture: "The impact of the action you are taking is to head this case in the direction of dismissal. Now I want a personal assurance that the President knows exactly what this means. You appear to be ignorant of the cases. While you're a distinguished lawyer, an advocate with a fine reputation, I want to know if the President is deliberately aborting this case by not submitting the required evidence." Pressed again by Gesell on the need to release "the whole story," St. Clair nervously wiped his brow and replied: "I've got no authority to accede. I'm in a very difficult position." Retorted Gesell: "Well, I've got to talk to you. I've got nobody else to talk to."

St. Clair finally agreed to discuss the matter again with Nixon and to submit a written explanation by June 3.

TIME, JUNE 3, 1974

Boy Scout Without a Compass

In January of last year, still flushed with the thrill of stage-managing Richard Nixon's triumphal second Inauguration, Jeb Stuart Magruder had to take care of what he hoped was one last nuisance left over from the previous year. Putting a handsome, confident face on whatever anxiety he may have felt, he appeared in Judge John Sirica's Washington courtroom and testified falsely as a witness for the prosecution at the trial of the Watergate burglars. Shortly afterward, he hopped a plane to California to explore launching his own elective career for secretary of state.

Last week Magruder, 39, was back before Sirica, this time as a confessed felon. On June 4, the very day of the California state G.O.P. primary he might have won if the Watergate cover-up and his personal game plan had worked, Magruder will go to jail. The ten-month minimum sentence for his part in the scandal was stiffer than he expected after more than a year of cooperation with the prosecutors. His pretty wife Gail could not hold back the tears, but Magruder kept his composure as he read a prepared statement to an impassive Sirica:

sive Sirica:

"I know what I have done, and your honor knows what I have done . . . Somewhere between my ambition and my ideals, I lost my ethical compass. I found myself on a path that had not been intended for me by my parents or my principles or by my own ethical instincts. It has led me to this courtroom."

To take advantage of Magruder's renewed notoriety, the New York City publishing house Atheneum rushed into print with his memoirs, *An American Life: One Man's Road to Watergate*, which were originally scheduled for release in mid-July. When Magruder surrenders next week to federal marshals who will escort him to a minimum-security prison in Allenwood, Pa., the 338-page volume will be on sale for \$10 in book stores along the East Coast.

Written for a reported \$100,000 advance with the help of Freelance Writer Patrick Anderson, Magruder's book contains only an occasional hint of the abject contrition that marked his final statement to the bench, and it offers little fresh evidence about the evolution of the Watergate crimes. He guesses Nixon was involved all along in the cover-up: "Based on my knowledge of how

the White House operated, I would suspect that once the burglars were arrested, Nixon immediately demanded and got the full story, and that thereafter he kept in close personal touch with the cover-up operation." But he does not know for certain. It is nonetheless a remarkable book, affording damning and often unintended insights into the author's character and the atmosphere of the Administration in which he worked.

Magruder begins with two chapters on his childhood and youth. He reveals that he grew up in a family overshadowed by scandal: his grandfather's career as a New York shipyard executive was ruined in the early 1920s when he was convicted and jailed for misapplication of \$300,000 in bank funds.

Reviewing his undergraduate days at Williams College, Magruder recalls that it was a dilemma over his sex life that led him to initiate his famous friendship with the Rev. William Sloane Coffin Jr. Magruder was dating a Vassar girl named Judy: "We felt a great physical attraction for one another, one that caused us both to be uncertain as to how far we should carry our relationship. Finally I went to Bill Coffin for advice." The reader is left wondering what counsel Coffin offered.

Hack Away. Magruder's book suggests that he was, and still is, oblivious of the moral ramifications of many acts he confesses so candidly. He recounts working on an automobile assembly line

the summer after his freshman year. The foreman taught him how to cheat systematically on the job: "I did as the foreman suggested, and even then it was hard to keep up." Period. On to the next anecdote.

Twenty years later, he tried to talk White House Counsel Charles Colson out of sending a phony supporter of Senator George McGovern to a homosexual rally "because it was likely that the trick would be found out." When he discovered that Political Prankster Donald Segretti was busily sabotaging the Democrats during the Wisconsin and New Hampshire primaries, he sent John Mitchell a memo headed "Potentially Embarrassing Situation," urging that Segretti be supervised "lest he harm the [Republican] campaign." (The job of overseeing Segretti went to E. Howard Hunt.)

Magruder is matter of fact to the point of Boy Scout insouciance in reporting how he dutifully carried out an order from Nixon to spread the word that an unfriendly journalist was a Communist agent, or how he produced, on H.R. Haldeman's demand, an eight-point plan to discredit NBC's David Brinkley. Haldeman was pleased. "Jeb, damn good! Hack away. H," he wrote on Magruder's memo.

Looking back on the Watergate break-in itself, Magruder has mostly tactical regret: "[G. Gordon] Liddy should have had a middleman between himself and the burglars so they could have no idea they were working for us, and even if arrested wouldn't implicate us." Liddy & Co. reflected "an exaggerated view of American political reality" shared by the White House.

The term "public relations" is ubiquitous in the book, just as the concept has been obsessional in the Nixon Ad-

ministration. Magruder says that the very words public relations were capitalized in presidential memos. The day after the C.R.P. wiretappers were arrested, a solicitous bodyguard in Los Angeles asked Magruder why he seemed worried, and Magruder tried to appear carefree by replying, "It's just a little PR problem back in Washington."

Magruder's evocation of the prevailing mentality in the White House is, in its way, nearly as revealing as that of the Nixon transcripts. In the best locker-room and fraternity tradition, all the President's men had their nicknames. John Dean told the Ervin committee last year about H.R. ("The Brush") Haldeman and John ("The Pipe") Mitchell, but Magruder adds to the list. Transportation Secretary John Volpe was "The Bus Driver"; Defense Secretary Melvin Laird was "The Bullet"; Postmaster General Winton Blount was "The Postman"; and Martha Mitchell was known as "The Account," an advertising term for a client. Nixon himself was above nicknames; in memos and meetings he was referred to as "RN," or "the President," or occasionally by his military code name, "Searchlight."

Mere Mortals. Nixon's once much feared palace guard emerges as more petty than sinister. Magruder describes how Haldeman once gave his young aide Larry Higby a brutal dressing-down for failing to provide a golf cart to take him 200 yds. across the presidential compound at San Clemente. Haldeman loved to make his far-flung assistants jump by activating their Pageboy beepers, especially when traveling in Air Force One: "[Nixon] and Haldeman and Chapin and the others in the traveling entourage would get up there, 30,000 ft. above the earth, and something would happen to them. It must have been the close-in atmosphere, or perhaps the plane's well-stocked bar or something about the altitude that made them feel God-like, but they would invariably begin to rain down calls upon us mere mortals here on earth, and there was no way to talk to them or reason with them." Magruder characterizes Press Secretary Ron Ziegler as "a for-

mer Disneyland guide who was scarcely more than a ventriloquist's dummy." Magruder came to the White House from a cosmetics-marketing firm.

The No. 1 villain of Magruder's piece is Colson, whom he calls "an evil genius." Despite his reputation as a grandmother-stomper, Colson comes across as almost pathetically small-time. When not waging interoffice battles against then Communications Director Herbert Klein, Colson seems to have been preoccupied with setting up something called Silent Majority, Inc., a proposed conservative research institute to counter the influence of the liberal Brookings Institution.

The author manages to make even Liddy seem like a logical addition to the Nixon team. After cataloguing examples of Liddy's unstable, potentially homicidal behavior, Magruder concludes blandly: "My personal distaste for him aside, he seemed like the right man for the dual job we envisioned [legal counsel and supersleuth for C.R.P.] . . . He was, in short, a professional, and ours was a campaign that looked to professionals for guidance . . . Perhaps it was just bad luck that he got there, or perhaps there was a certain historical inevitability to Liddy—perhaps if there had been no Liddy we would have created one." Elsewhere he quotes White House Aide Gordon Strachan as saying more succinctly, "Liddy's a Hitler, but at least he's our Hitler."

Only on the subject of Nixon does Magruder offer a sustained, considered judgment: "Without question, Nixon had the potential to be the greatest conservative political leader of his time; he knew his goals and he had the skills required to achieve them. Yet he had a fatal flaw too, an inability to tolerate criticism, an instinct to overreact in political combat. I don't know which came first, the liberals' loathing of Nixon or Nixon's loathing of the liberals, but the passions fed on one another, grew more and more bitter, until once he achieved the presidency, Nixon could not resist the urge to use his awesome powers to 'get' his enemies. A President sets the tone of his Administration."

WALL STREET JOURNAL
24 MAY 1974

Washington Wire

A Special Weekly Report From
The Wall Street Journal's
Capital Bureau

NEVER AGAIN, the CIA insists. Burned by Watergate entanglement, intelligence staffers vow to avoid any comparable domestic involvement in the future. Director William Colby issues steer-clear instruction, but the real guarantee is staff readiness to explode if it seems the agency is being misused.

WASHINGTON STAR

16 May 1974

Nixon Standing Firm

*'I have to be here,
and I intend to be here.'*

By James J. Kilpatrick

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President Nixon will not resign "under any circumstances." He will not surrender his office even temporarily to Vice President Gerald R. Ford under the 25th Amendment.

If the House of Representatives should vote to impeach, he will accept the outcome "with good grace." He will then defend himself to the very end of a Senate trial.

The President made these views perfectly clear—emphatically clear—in an exclusive interview in the Oval Office on Tuesday morning.

He acknowledged that he had given "long thought" to the possibility of resignation. For one overriding reason he has now discarded that option and will not consider it again: For him to resign under the pressure of mere popular opinion, in his view, would fatally weaken Presidents of the future.

As for taking temporary refuge in the 25th Amendment: This a "rather fatuous suggestion," advanced by people who "do not know what is going on in the world."

The President talked soberly and sadly of the Watergate affair. He said it was true, as John Mitchell had surmised, that he would have "blown my top" if he had known of the bugging at the time.

He recalled how much he had resented it when he learned that his own offices had been bugged in his 1962 gubernatorial campaign. He also remembered 1968 with equal resentment: "There was not only surveillance by the FBI, but bugging by the FBI, and (J. Edgar) Hoover told me that my plane in the last two weeks was bugged."

MR. NIXON also discussed the now famous White House tapes: He thought he was wrong ever to have permitted these recordings in the first place, but he supposed the remaining tapes eventually will be deposited in a presidential library for the use of historians 25 or 30 years hence, after the participants are dead.

In a long soliloquy, Mr. Nixon spoke of the need for a strong American President, equipped by experience to deal at the summit with world leaders. He was asked whether, if worst comes to worst, and he is put on trial by the Senate, he could simultaneously manage the affairs of the country and look after his own defense.

"Yes," he said grimly. "And I intend to."

During the course of the interview—more a monologue than an interview—the President spoke with

guarded optimism about Republican prospects in November, when he expects the "gut issues" of peace and prosperity to favor his party. He got in a few mild licks at the "ultra-liberal" press. He termed himself both a conservative and a Wilsonian.

THE PRESIDENT looked well and strong. He also looked his full 60 years. In response to a question, he said he sleeps very well—"as well as anybody at this age sleeps." Having profited from earlier crises, he has been able to survive Watergate without "tingling nerves and a churning stomach."

To this observer, it seemed evident that the President has lost some of the edge of sharp incisiveness that he exhibited a few years ago. His conversation tends to run off on tangents. A reporter, studying his shorthand notes, finds them littered with broken sentences. But the President plainly is in command of his situation: "I am a disciplined man," he said at one point. He is not about to quit.

Mr. Nixon spoke from behind his desk in the Oval Office. Outside the great windows, a crew of White House gardeners pattered about the lawn. His mood was at once reflective and determined.

Once he raised his voice in anger when this correspondent suggested that the President's associates might have "betrayed" him by failing to keep him informed: "I'm not going to indulge in a conversation with you or anybody else condemning men who have given very great service to this country."

Otherwise he reacted even to sharp questions with quiet good humor. In an hour and 20 minutes, not a single expletive had to be deleted.

WHAT OF the future? "I would have to rule out resignation. And I would have to rule out the rather fatuous suggestion that I take the 25th Amendment and just step out and have Vice President Ford step in for a while. If the House should vote an impeachment, and we go to trial by the Senate, of course I would follow that course."

"It would be immensely time-consuming, but I could do it, and I would do it for reasons that are not—what do you call it—those of a treader in the ring, trying to prove himself, but I would do it because I have given long thought to what is best for the country, our system of government, and the constitutional process."

"I am a disciplined man, and you can be sure that what would come first, even in such a trial, would be the business of this government."

The President feels he is equipped and experienced to handle the great issues he sees ahead—"our dialogue with the Chinese, the enormously important negotiations which will continue with the Russians, and the very delicate situation in the Middle East."

Mr. Nixon turned away from his interviewer and gazed at the gardens without seeing them. He talked of the role he wants to play in the search for relative peace: "We have one of those times when certain forces are coming together that may never come together again. We must seize this moment. If we do not seize it, the world will inevitably move to a conflagration that will destroy everything that we've made—everything that this civilization has produced."

FOREIGN policy, he said, no longer is made by foreign ministers. It is made by heads of state. "I have to be here, and I intend to be here." It would create a gap for a President to say, "Well, I've been impeached by the House, and I'll just step aside, and somebody else will step in." In Mr. Nixon's view, "It would be wrong!"

This is the key point, he said, on resignation: "The United States holds the key as to whether peace survives and whether freedom survives. That demands a strong United States—strong militarily, strong economically, and strong in the character of its people, a people with a sense of vision, not turning inward and tearing each other apart, and not becoming soft as they become rich."

"But it also requires, whoever may be in this office, a strong President. I will never leave this office in a way which resigning would be, or failing to fight impeachment would be, that would make it more difficult for future presidents to make the tough decisions."

If he should resign now, Mr. Nixon said, "knowing that I am not guilty of any offense under the Constitution that is called an impeachable offense," every president in the future would be constantly poring over the polls and looking over his shoulder toward Capitol Hill.

A president, he said, cannot be strong if he worries incessantly about his popularity or about the possibility of impeachment. He did not mean that a president should be

bullheaded or arrogant. It is only that a president "must do what is right, whatever the public opinion may be at the moment."

Unless the United States has such presidents for the next 25 years, "the chance for peace and freedom to survive in the world is down the tube. That's the reason I won't resign."

"I WILL not resign," the President repeated, "and I will of course present the case on impeachment before the House as effectively as we can. I shall accept the verdict in good grace, but I know that the United States of America means something in the world today not just because of its military and economic strength, but also because it has stability in its leadership."

"Resignation or impeachment would have the traumatic effect of destroying that sense of stability and leadership. And as far as this particular President is concerned, I will not be a party under any circumstances to any action which would set that kind of precedent."

Two weeks ago, the President was reminded, his chief counsel, James St. Clair, had met with the press. St. Clair was asked if all the national security incidents that the plumbers engaged in had been made public. St. Clair had responded: "I don't know. I doubt it." The President was asked for comment: Had all the incidents been revealed?

"There are some that have not been and never will be," he said. Sen. Sam Ervin (D-N.C.) and Howard Baker (R-Tenn.) know of these unpublicized matters, Mr. Nixon said, but the national security continues to demand that the incidents be kept under wraps.

THE CONVERSATION turned to general comment on the necessity, as the President sees it, for secrecy in the conduct of foreign affairs.

"You cannot in today's world have successful diplomacy without secrecy. It is impossible. I used to say that I believe in the Wilsonian doctrine of open covenants openly arrived at. But that was Wilson at his idealistic best and his pragmatic worst. Open covenants, yes; there should be no secret agreements that the country is not totally committed to. But openly arrived at? There would be no covenants. It is impossible. And it is particularly impossible when you are dealing not with your friends, but with your adversaries."

Surely this was true, the President said, in the opening to China. It never would have occurred without the highest secrecy. Nobody knew about the overtures save the President, Henry Kissinger, and a few aides sworn to secrecy. Mr. Nixon was asked: Did his vice president know?

"Agnew?" The President seemed incredulous. "Agnew? Oh, of course not."

RETURNING to contemporary issues, Mr. Nixon responded to a question about the origin and ultimate

disposition of the presidential tapes.

"They were made, curiously enough, in a very offhand decision. We had no tapes, as you know, up until 1971. I think one day Haldeman walked in and said, 'The library believes it is essential that we have tapes,' and I said why? He said, well, Johnson had tapes — they're in his library at Austin — and these are invaluable records. Kennedy also had tapes, and he said, 'You ought to have some record that can be used years later for historical purposes.'"

"I said all right. I must say that after the system was put in, as the transcribed conversations clearly indicated, I wasn't talking with knowledge or with the feeling that the tapes were there. Otherwise I might have talked differently."

"My own view," Mr. Nixon added, "is that taping of conversations for historical purposes was a bad decision on the part of all the presidents. I don't think Kennedy should have done it. I don't think Johnson should have done it, and I don't think we should have done it."

The remaining tapes, the President supposed, would be deposited in his presidential library. He had given no thought to their disposition. But in any event, the tapes would be protected by adequate security and careful guidelines so that none of his former associates would be embarrassed in their lifetimes.

THE PRESIDENT mused that historians eventually would benefit from the candid give-and-take of the war years. He supposed a tape must exist of "the loneliest decision of all, the bombing of Dec. 18, 1972, which brought the war to an end." That decision was opposed by all his Cabinet members save one, and supported only by John Connally. An earlier decision on Cambodia "had very little support from my advisers."

As for the transcribed tapes immediately at issue, he sees no reason to permit their further examination by technicians. "We've already done that." He scoffed at the notion that damaging material had been removed deliberately to prevent the House Judiciary Committee from discovering it.

"The committee now has constructive possession of all of the tapes — of all 42 of them. The chairman and ranking member can listen to them at any time." It is an "open-ended invitation." They can come hear for themselves. "And believe me, I wouldn't have made the offer if there was anything to hide."

Was publication of the transcripts a gamble? The President did not see it that way. Gambling, he said, offers a choice. He had played a little poker. He knew that you had a choice of getting in the pot or staying out. "In this instance we had no choice."

He would have preferred to turn over no tapes at all. That was the right position in the beginning, and "had we prevailed in the courts, it was the position I would have stuck to." But the public had to be assured that he knew nothing of Watergate or the cover-up, and that he did something about it when he learned the facts.

"I did an awful lot. I cut off one arm, then the other arm, and April of 1973 was about as rugged a period as anybody could be through."

The worst hour came with his request that H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman submit resignations. "There was nobody who could talk to them except me."

He was asked how he let the Watergate affair get out of hand at the beginning.

"As I look back," he said, "and here history will have to record whether I made the right decision in terms of the allocation of my time, my major error was not doing what many persons very appropriately criticized me for doing in previous campaigns — that was always running my own campaign."

In other years, he recalled, he had checked everything out himself. In 1972, "I didn't look at budgets, I didn't look at personnel — I just didn't pay enough attention to the campaign." He never would have tolerated the Watergate incident if he had known of it: "I believe in hard, tough campaigning, but I believe it has to be fair."

WHEN HE first learned of the original Watergate arrests, he was concerned for the embarrassment it would cause his campaign. Soon his concern broadened: He feared the FBI's investigation would become entangled with CIA operations in the national security, and this he was determined to avoid. The thought never crossed his mind, he said, that blackmail, hush money, and a cover-up might emerge.

Ruefully he conceded that such a thought probably should have crossed his mind, that "we better do something to keep these guys in good shape or they are going to tell all the story." But he was preoccupied with other things — chiefly with the final stages of disengagement in Vietnam.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, MAY 25, 1974

Governing During Impeachment

By Marcus G. Raskin

Congress while asserting its impeachment power must also guarantee to the citizenry a functioning Government within the framework of a constitutional democracy. What follows, in an open memorandum to Congress, is a series of steps designed to achieve this end.

1. If Congress, through formal constitutional means, asserts its loss of confidence in President Nixon by a successful impeachment vote in the House against him, those national emergency powers Congressionally given to the President, and which depend on the President's personal discretion, should be withdrawn. Such powers must revert to Congress.

It may be necessary to divide "emergency" powers. They include powers granted to the President in the event of natural disaster, economic difficulties or trade negotiations; powers over internal security, national security and foreign policy, as well as use of the military and control over it.

The powers that are Congressionally granted to a President do not include his own residual or "inherent" powers. Those are stripped from a President once he is successfully impeached by the Senate, although politically such powers begin to drop from him once the impeachment process begins.

Residual powers have the color of legitimacy only because the President is trusted by Congress and the people. The nation's political health requires that the President's discretion should be sharply decreased once he is impeached. His role must be limited to that of administrator of the laws, thus forfeiting the power of independent policymaking.

2. In the succeeding thirty days, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, military commanders, the National Guard, as well as all members of the executive branch and policymaking members of the bureaucracy should be given a memorandum from Congress, signed by its leadership, that details the meaning of their oaths to the Constitution, to the authority of Congress and to the laws of the land.

The oaths and memorandum should be circulated throughout the Government and be posted in Government and military offices, and in paramilitary offices of the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Secret Service. The Civil Service Commissioners should meet with appropriate committee chairmen on how to effect smooth operations of the Government during this period.

3. A dialogue should begin among leading members of the judiciary and among Armed-Services, Appropriations and Foreign-Affairs Committees to identify crises and make sure that no

foreign or national security crisis occurs because of the impeachment.

Once the House votes impeachment the President should be separated from unilateral decisions on the use of troops or weapons of mass destruction. He and groups within the Government should be insulated from instigating any sort of crisis, military or otherwise, that would disturb the task of weighing impeachment evidence fairly, or the Government's smooth and just functioning. And the United States should conduct its world business without flexing its military muscles, managing its foreign affairs in a careful and deliberate manner.

4. To insure constitutional stability, notification should be given to the chairmen of the appropriate committees and the House and Senate leadership by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, countersigned by the Secretary of Defense, of all troop—including the National Guard—movements, naval movements, deployments inside and outside the United States, as well as security arrangements concerning nuclear arms.

The Defense Department should file information with appropriate committee chairmen and the House and Senate leadership on those covert operations or actions that are likely to, or might, cause internal or international repercussions. This arrangement should hold from the beginning of the impeachment debate on the House floor to the time the President is vindicated or removed from office.

5. A concurrent resolution should be passed rejecting the first use of nuclear weapons.

6. The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the Majority Leader of the Senate, from the beginning of the formal impeachment on the House floor, should sit in on all National Security Council and Cabinet meetings. The Speaker of the House or his nominee should attend Cabinet meetings if he so desires.

7. The Senate and House should prepare a concurrent resolution that states that no troops can be used in battle, hostile actions or war or police actions by the President without legislative concurrence of the House and Senate.

8. The House and Senate leadership should appoint a special committee to receive briefings from career members of the various Government agencies during the impeachment proceedings in the House, during any hiatus between House and Senate action, during the Senate trial, and after the trial until President Nixon is acquitted or a new President is inaugurated.

Watergate events should not be read to mean that the military, or paramilitary groups of the Secret Service, F.B.I. or C.I.A., have been insulated from either corrupt or dangerous practices, from cabals or crimes. Watergate's questionable activities are not the only ones in Washington.

9. The Speaker and the Majority Leader should meet with the heads of the television networks and the Federal Communications Commission to set up telecast times for reporting to the public during the impeachment period. One purpose of such reports would be to sustain loyalty to the constitutional democracy.

10. Meetings should be initiated with mayors and governors, individually and through their collective organizations, to discuss the impeachment period. These leaders should formally receive copies of the basic memorandum to be sent to Federal officials that outlines the powers of Congress to regulate the armed forces, the National Guard and the paramilitary.

11. Since the impeachment period has brought a profound sense of drift in the Government, and important issues have gone unattended, and frightening structural changes in the constitutional system have been made, the sense of drift and some of these structural changes can be corrected.

It is time to develop a national committee of reconciliation that will take in left and right to recommend to Congress a national program in foreign and domestic policy that will lay out what a minimum program must be over the next five years, while stating clearly what national and internal security structures decrease the political and economic freedom and security of citizens.

Such a committee might also begin the task of meeting with appropriate Cabinet heads and the appropriate committees of Congress to discuss a legislative program that would provide the basis for a national-policy dialogue through 1976.

12. One of the crucial problems of the present system is that the people have very little confidence in it. One reason for this loss of confidence is that the citizens do not identify with any branch of Government. Congress as an institution does not directly relate to the people on a daily basis; if otherwise, this would give people the feeling that they are involved in governing.

Members of Congress should establish a mechanism in their districts for public hearings on national and regional issues to define policy. It is especially critical during a period of profound dislocation that our citizens feel they can in fact defend the Constitution and view the Government as a lawful enterprise. This message must be conveyed throughout the entire period of impeachment. And beyond.

Marcus G. Raskin, a member of the National Security Council in the Kennedy Administration, is co-director of the Institute for Policy Studies.

SANTA MONICA EVENING OUTLOOK
13 MAY 1974

CIA Chief Cites New Intelligence Methods

By CLIFF TARPY
Evening Outlook Staff Writer

Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby, speaking in Century City Friday night, credited a new brand of intelligence based on improved technology for breaking the ground with the Soviet Union in the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) talks.

"In the common understanding, intelligence is still linked with secrecy and spying," Colby told a dinner meeting of the Los Angeles World Affairs Council.

But, he said, "we in America have changed the scope of the word 'intelligence' so that it has come to mean something different from that old-fashioned perception."

Colby credited that change, in part, to the "technological genius of Americans."

Varied Talents

"We have applied to intelligence the talents of our inventors, of our engineers, and of our scientists," Colby said. "In the short space of 18 years since the U-2 (spy plane) began its missions, we have revolutionized intelligence."

In the past, American intelligence officers had to resort to piecing together information largely from "circumstantial evidence."

Technical advances, however, "not only provide a better basis for decisions about the national security of the United States, it also enables us to negotiate agreements such as the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty," Colby said.

Only after America was able to monitor compliance with arms treaties from afar did the U.S. become confident enough of its own intelligence to enter arms reductions talks, he said.

In addition to improved technology, modern intelligence gathering has also been advanced by two other means, which Colby referred to as having stemmed "from characteristics peculiar to America and from the nature of our society."

One of those contributions grew from the "bad habit" that America had of disbanding intelligence operations once a war was over, requiring its hasty reassembly before the beginning of a new one.

This changed during World War II when the first intelligence director, William Donovan, set up a continuous information gathering system that Colby called the "analysis, assessment and estimating process."

The value of that system showed up during the Vietnam conflict, he said, and were revealed with the release of the Pentagon Papers, "in which the various national estimates on Vietnam were shown to have been independent, objective, assessments of the likely future course of events there."

Colby admitted that the CIA "made mistakes" with the information gathering network, citing the information, disguises and equipment made available to the White House "plumbers."

However, noting that the National Security Act of 1947 prohibits "internal security functions," he said, "I am confident and have assured the Congress publicly that it will be respected in the future."

Unique Aspect

The third unique aspect of American intelligence, Colby said, is the CIA's relationship to Congress.

"Some of the foreign counterparts around the world display considerable shock when they learn that I appeared in an open hearing before the television cameras as a part of my Senate confirmation," Colby said. "Many of them would never be subjected to detailed scrutiny by their Parliament and their identities are frequently totally unknown."

The CIA is subject to oversight by Congress, he said, and some of lawmakers are privy to the agency's operations.

Unlike other nations' intelligence operations, the CIA has a substantial degree of public exposure but at the same time must operate largely in secrecy, he said.

"We will consequently continue to arouse wonder-

LOS ANGELES TIMES
23 May 1974

CIA Plan to Declassify Secret Charter Told

By RUDY ABRAMSON
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — Officials of the Central Intelligence Agency have drawn tentative plans for disclosing the secret charter which has enabled the CIA to conduct operations outside the bounds of congressional or public scrutiny for more than a quarter century, it was learned Wednesday.

Drafts of unclassified versions of the agency's top secret operating authority have been written for ranking officials' review and will be studied further by its legal experts before they are forwarded to the National Security Council at the White House for clearance.

The move was viewed by some outside the CIA as an effort to mend an image tarnished by the Watergate scandal and to further Director William E. Colby's wishes that the agency appear more candid about its role.

No firm decision has been made on how or when such a document would be released, but agency officials have decided that at least the broad outlines of the secret charter should be declassified.

The real specifics of the CIA's operating authority are known to only a few senior members of Congress who lead committees charged with overseeing the agency. Even they

were unaware of the details until last year.

After exposure of efforts to use the CIA in the Watergate coverup and its assistance to the burglars of the office Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, the secret charter was shown to Sens. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) and John L. McClellan (D-Ark.). Neither was permitted to keep a copy of the document.

The secret charter is in the form of National Security Council Intelligence Directives, "enskids" as they are called, which have been written since the National Security Act of 1947 established the CIA.

The first of the directives is understood to have authorized the conduct of covert CIA operations abroad, and others to have approved activities bringing a major expansion of the intelligence bureaucracy.

Prof. Harry Howe Ransome of Vanderbilt University, one of the country's academic authorities on U.S. intelligence activities, has complained that expansion of CIA activity via the National Security Council Intelligence Directives amounts to a writing of laws by the few people who direct the country's intelligence apparatus.

foreign associates as to our openness, and concern among some American citizens that we still must keep some information secret if we are to conduct an intelligence effort at

TRUE
JUNE 1974

EMILY, MICKEY AND WILLIE: THE NEW LOOK IN LOW-KEY SPIES

Cloak-and-dagger derring-do and Mata Hari high jinks are out. Today's dirty work is done by quiet types from Dullsville

BY MILES COPELAND

ILLUSTRATED BY JOHN STYGA

Following the Lambton-Jellicoe affair, in which two members of the British nobility were discovered to have been consorting with call girls, a security commission was formed to ascertain the extent to which the British Government's security had been endangered. Members of the commission, under Lord Diplock, concentrated on the question of whether or not either of the unfortunate peers might have blurted out TOP SECRETS while engaged in post-coital pillow talk—and whether the fact that one of them was smoking pot during intercourse had a bearing. They dealt only summarily with the question of possible blackmail, since it was apparent to all of them that the lords, both basically good and honest men, would have scoffed at any blackmailer.

British security officials no doubt had their reasons for letting the report go unchallenged, but they must have been appalled by its naiveté. Some espionage services make extensive use of prostitutes—and “sex bars,” massage parlors, escort services, model studios, and all the rest—but not to tease secrets out of their targets. They use such resources *only* to get their targets into compromising positions, so that blackmail can follow. As security officials well know, there was no danger whatever that either of the two lords, whether on pot or alcohol, would give away secrets to the prostitutes. Can you imagine Lambton, with a puff on his joint, saying, “Darling, I simply *must* tell you about the X5-11”—or the prostitute having the faintest idea what he was talking about even if he did? The danger was not loose talk while “under the influence,” but exposure to blackmail—and not blackmail by some Soho pimp, but by a trained “case officer” using highly sophisticated methods.

Before settling down with their findings in the Lambton-Jellicoe affair, members of the Diplock Commission would do well to study how the modern espionage service works. They may start by considering how the KGB does, in fact, try to penetrate our two governments,

then move on to a consideration of what our two services do to penetrate “the other side.”

Let us start with the case of “Emily,” an attractive but shy lady who, one spring evening, met a kindly, handsome man of about 40 whom we may call “Foster.”

Emily was personal assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State who headed a departmental bureau dealing with an important segment of the Third World. As such, she had access to all the secrets of that bureau—exchanges with the British and the

French with respect to policies, intentions of the U.S. Government in connection with the carrying out of these policies, secret agreements with leaders of governments in the Third World, and contingency plans of a U.S. fleet in the event of conceivable emergencies. Foster was “in insurance,” and had no visible interest in international politics.

The meeting, which occurred at a tea in honor of the famous anthropologist Margaret Mead, took place on the same day that Emily had received bad news about her mother. Emily's mother, a whining, malingering widow of 80 years, had just learned that she had cancer. The doctor had pronounced her beyond the stage at which an operation would help and had predicted that she would live for a few more years and would then die a slow and painful death.

There was nothing remarkable about Emily's meeting with Foster, except that in the course of the evening he spilled *vin rosé* over her new dress and Emily, already upset, burst into tears. Foster apologized profusely and insisted on accompanying her to her home in Georgetown, where he waited until she changed into a housecoat so that he could take the wine-splotted dress to “a French laundry I know that can remove any kind of spot.” After one nightcap, they shook hands at the door, and Foster departed.

Their friendship blossomed. It was “not the great romance of the century” as Emily later admitted, but it was “very pleasant and undemanding.”

Foster didn't seem to want anything, not even sex, and he took no interest whatever in Emily's job. He seemed genuinely to enjoy Emily's company, and he knew all sorts of cozy little restaurants—in Georgetown, out Massachusetts Avenue, across the Maryland line from southeast Washington—where they could talk and share personal confidences. They went to plays, concerts and the movies. Foster obviously wasn't rich,

Excerpted from the book *Without Cloak or Dagger* by Miles Copeland. Copyright © 1974 by Miles Copeland. Reprinted by permission of Simon & Schuster, Inc.

but he could afford all the simple pleasures, and he treated Emily in such a way that she had no sense of being “cultivated.”

Before many months had passed, Foster induced Emily to lean on him financially. At first the amounts were small, and Foster had to use the argument “It's for your mother.” Later, the amounts were larger and more regular, and without realizing it Emily began to count on them as a part of her normal income. Foster asked for nothing in return, except for an occasional quick kiss—though his manner did suggest that his feelings were not *entirely* platonic.

Indeed, for him not to have done so would have appeared unnatural.

Then, one day, Foster asked Emily for a small favor. Being in the insurance business in a town where an enormously high percentage of the population were government-employed, he naturally wanted to “break into the State Department market”—which, according to common belief, consists of careerists who not only receive extremely high salaries but have extensive private means. “I could make my living just selling life insurance to your friends,” Foster told Emily. He then asked for a list of her acquaintances at the State Department, together with brief descriptions of their various assignments.

Emily resisted at first, arguing that the State Department publishes annually a *Biographic Register*, a *Foreign Service List*, and other such materials which are easily obtainable from the Government Book Store on Pennsylvania Avenue. Foster explained that he wanted “not the sort of stuff one would find in a register,” but personal information that would indicate which employees were particularly good prospects for insurance. “I could arrange a cocktail party and have you meet some of them,” said Emily. “No, not yet,” said Foster. “Besides, for a while we must keep it confidential. Don't tell *anybody*.”

Emily didn't understand why the information she could give Foster on her friends would be of any real help to him, or why the information should be kept secret, but she did as he asked. Soon she was gossiping freely about her associates and even about some of the confidential matters with which they dealt. Occasionally, remembering her Departmental security indoctrination, she would giggle and say, “I really shouldn't be telling you such things! You must never tell anyone I told you!” Foster assured her that he wouldn't.

Foster, an officer of the U.S.S.R.'s secret intelligence service, was putting Emily through what is known as “pre-recruitment development.” Rule number one is “Never ask the prospective agent to do anything that is beyond what his conscience will allow. The first task in

developing the prospective agent is to expand his conscience gradually, so that he will eventually do what you want him to do without qualms." By the time Foster was asking Emily to bring home secret documents in the evening (to be photocopied, and replaced in the files when she returned to work the following morning), she was ready. In fact, he knew that she had become a Soviet agent.

Emily served Soviet Intelligence for 14 years—without incident. She built up a sizable bank account in Beirut, Lebanon, and within a few years she could have retired in comfort. Foster disappeared early in her career of espionage, but an attractive, independently wealthy, intelligent woman can always uncover romantic possibilities even when she has entered her fifties.

Then one spring morning, almost 14 years to the day after Emily first met Foster, a Soviet defector being interrogated by experts at the CIA "human library" in the Allegheny Mountains mentioned offhandedly: "We knew all along about the stuff you planted on us on the—affair." Upon being pressed by the interrogator, he described "the stuff" in some detail and, although he couldn't identify the exact source, he had inferred from the content that it came—or was supposed to have come—from the office of Assistant Secretary—and that the source was probably the secretary's personal assistant. He said that Soviet analysts, after many years, had come to the conclusion that much of the information was fake.

The investigation led straight to Emily. And Emily, under the kindly questioning of the State Department's chief security officer, who had been her friend for many years, confessed all.

What to do? Here was a longtime Soviet agent planted deep inside the Department's inner circles of secrecy, who had passed over to the Soviets God-knew-what information. Possibly, the harm had not been too great because, if the Soviet defector was to be believed, the Soviets had for some years regarded Emily's information as fake. Only one conclusion could be drawn with any degree of certainty: the harm resulting from revealing the affair to the public would greatly outweigh any advantages to be gained from bringing Emily to trial. There was simply no way to explain to the public how even the finest security system cannot prevent penetrations such as Emily's. So when a CIA expert on "disinformation" suggested that the Department exploit the Soviets' apparent belief that Emily had been a deception agent all along, the Department's security authorities leaped at it. Emily was left at her post, but during the following weeks she was made to pass the Soviets materials that would be seen through as fake but would, retroactively, increase their suspicions of the genuine materials they had received in the past.

Eventually, Emily got off scot-free—except, that is, for having to return to the U.S. Government most of the \$100,000 which she had accumulated in the Beirut bank. Emily was

some administrative post and, shortly thereafter, under an arrangement with the security office, she announced that she had contracted some nervous disease and would have to seek less demanding employment outside of Government. She is now working as a librarian in some rather small New England town.

"Emily" is one kind of spy the Central Intelligence Agency's instructors in "Management of the Espionage Operation" have in mind as they train new officers. "First," begins the opening lecture in the course, "you must put out of your mind all you have read about spies. The spies you have read about, by the mere fact that you have read about them, are exceptions. The spies who interest us are the ones who do not get caught, and who therefore are not to be read about."

The lecture indicates that most spies live uneventful lives, often to retire in comfort on earnings stashed away in foreign banks. It includes the phrase, borrowed from British Intelligence, "A good espionage operation is like a good marriage. Nothing out of the ordinary ever happens in it. It is uneventful. It does not make a good story."

Naturally, teaching new officers about typically effective spies, not the bumbler who get caught, poses awkward problems. The officers study case histories of those few spies for "the other side" who were effective enough but were caught by accident. They also study histories of spies on their own side who lived out long careers without getting caught, and whom they can learn about by reading sanitized accounts from CIA operational records. There is a limit, however, to how much can be learned from reading about successful CIA spies. Since they are all of other nationalities and cultures, it is difficult for the new officers to identify with them. CIA trainers want their students to get the *feeling* of espionage, of what it feels like to be a spy, and they therefore prefer to teach case histories of Soviet spies working against American targets, since these spies are American citizens, usually of educational and social backgrounds similar to those of the students themselves. Once they get a feel for the motivations, foibles and anxieties of these, they can move on to a more difficult step, that of understanding citizens of Communist countries who are agents of the CIA.

The spies whose case histories are first taught to students in the CIA's school on espionage management are American citizens of these categories:

1. The "Emily"—the spy who was originally spotted by a KGB recruiter, also an American citizen, who recognized his or her potential, and who was conditioned, recruited and trained, like the original Emily, according to conventional principles of agent management;
2. The "Mickey"—the "walk-in" spy who, because of special knowledge and experience, was able to get in touch with a foreign intelligence agency and offer his services without being spotted by counterintelligence;
3. The "Philby"—the long-term agent,

recruitment was outside his assigned target and took years working his way into it;

4. The "Willie"—the spy who is actually working for one intelligence service (e.g., the Soviets) but who, for at least part of his career, is led by his "principal" to believe that he is working for another (e.g., an industrial-espionage organization, a credit-investigation organization, or a newspaper columnist).

The case histories that most conveniently illustrate these categories are cases of Soviet penetrations of Western targets, but they are with only minor differences also illustrative of Western penetrations of Communist targets—or of penetrations of any country's secret installations.

"Even the CIA can have its penetrations," said defense members of that Agency when they heard about Emily. "Only the CIA could have penetrations like Mickey's," retorted State Department officials when, months later, they learned of the CIA's most serious known penetration, "Mickey," as we shall call him, was a "walk-in" agent who could never have made his initial contacts with the Soviets without his CIA background and skills. Having decided that he had information for which the Soviets would pay large sums, he figured out a basic operational plan for extracting the information from CIA files, and then made contact with the Soviets. His professional training made it easy to avoid traps that invariably catch the amateur "walk-in," and once he had made contact, he set his own terms. Soviet Intelligence could take them or leave them. It accepted.

Mickey was a mad Irish-American who felt strongly about politics only when he was drinking, and even then his feelings were such a mixture of extreme right-wing conservatism and leftist resentment of the CIA's "Ivy League dilettantes" that his best friends, when they were questioned just after his capture, were unable to give any clues as to where he stood on the major political issues of the day. In all probability, security analysts eventually decided, he had no political views: certainly, when he eventually tried to justify his behavior in terms of political convictions ("It will look better for you if you appear to have been moved by ideology rather than simple financial greed," his legal adviser had told him), he could speak only in clichés, and these were interspersed with outbursts totally incompatible with the politics of his Soviet employers.

When Mickey approached the Soviets, he was a senior member of a CIA unit that received "raw information" from all the U.S. Government's sources—published materials, reports from diplomats and intelligence "stations," technical gimmickry and liaison with friendly governments. His unit then processed the material into "finished intelligence" summaries that were sufficiently dependable, timely and brief for the President of the United States. Mickey had virtually all the TOP SECRET security clearances; he attended top staff meetings not only of the CIA itself but, on occasion, of various bureaus of the State and Defense departments. His closest friends were CIA officers who dealt with the Agency's most sensitive problems. He knew as much as it was possible for one man to know, given the U.S. Government's "need to know" policies, about how our Government saw the rest of the world, mainly Soviet Russia. Although he was excluded from discussions of policy, he was able to observe policymakers' reactions to the intelligence they received, and so could accurately estimate the policies they would recommend. For the U.S. Government, he was a topflight intelligence analyst; for Soviet Intelligence, he was a top espionage agent. "Had he not been caught in the end," said one of

his superiors, "he might have received service decorations from both sides."

Mickey died "of a heart attack" late in 1964, just as his interrogation was ending. The penultimate paragraph of the report of Mickey's interrogation, the one entitled "Financial Arrangements," was never finished; but the paragraph on "Mode of Operation" was complete, if chillingly brief. It said simply that at irregular intervals, perhaps as often as three to five times a month, Mickey took secret documents home with him in the evenings (as do many senior officers of the CIA), photocopied them, and returned them to his office the following morning. To avoid being detected in the course of the security office's nighttime spot-checks of the files, he habitually substituted dummies for those documents he had removed. He met his Soviet case officer at bimonthly intervals, and his weekly deliveries of photocopies and written reports were made via dead-letter drops and "brush" contacts in public places—the men's room of the Mayflower Hotel, a neighborhood movie house, the locker room of a public athletic club, a municipal golf course.

All was routine; nothing out of the ordinary ever happened. There was no "story." In all the many years that Mickey worked for the Soviets, there were only two "incidents." The first occurred when, through elaborate special arrangements, Mickey crossed into East Berlin to meet "headquarters officers" who were curious to see such an exceptionally productive agent; the second was the one instance when a check of the files by the security office took place on the one night when Mickey forgot to substitute dummies, and particularly sensitive documents were found to be missing. This latter incident led to an investigation. While it is not unusual for documents to be missing from files of officers who insist, despite regulations, on doing "homework," it became increasingly evident that Mickey's comments and behavior did not reflect the kind of knowledge he would have had were he doing "homework" on the documents.

Mickey's successful and uneventful career as a Soviet agent lasted just under 13 years, from early 1952 until late 1964. "There is literally *nothing* extraordinary to be found in his case history," the chief investigating officer told Admiral William Raborn, then Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. His motivations, insofar as they could be determined from the interrogation, were unremarkable—in fact, they were shared by numerous other Agency officers any one of whom, under conceivable circumstances, might have been moved to sell out to the Soviets. There was nothing ingenious about his "walk-in" approach; there was nothing in his behavior that could have been prevented by any reasonable security precautions. After all, the security office could not possibly keep every member of the CIA under 24-hour surveillance. There was not even anything remarkable about his financial situation: he was not in any particular financial difficulty when he first approached the Soviets, and the \$100,000 or so he must have collected from the Soviets was not reflected in his spending habits. The money is probably still intact in some Swiss bank.

Like the Emily affair, the Mickey case was hushed up. Nothing would have been gained by calling public attention to the fact that such an important penetration had taken place, particularly since similar penetrations might still be in progress.

Kim Philby, the Soviet agent who penetrated the British Intelligence Service, is a "famous spy," but his fame resulted from a fluke, as did his discovery. Had he not escaped to Russia, he would almost certainly have been liquidated (as Mickey was)

or neutralized (as Emily was) and the world would have heard nothing of him. He meets our qualifications for men studying as a "real" spy. He was of proved effectiveness; he was caught really by chance; and his personal history indicates that he was not unique—that there may be others like him still planted in Western governments.

The Philby case has some, but not much, relevance to modern-day espionage. During the Thirties, when Hitler was on the rise and the economic depression in the West was at its worst, the Soviets recruited to the cause of Communism scores of young men and women—Americans, Britons, Europeans—who had not yet chosen their careers. Of these, a percentage were instructed, first, to "go underground" and conceal their Communist sympathies; second, to seek employment in their respective governments. Of these, the majority fizzled out—either because they decided to come into the open with their Communist views, or because they lost interest in the cause altogether, or because they were unable to find government employment that fitted both their personal interests and those of the Soviets.

The "Philby" is entirely a feature of Soviet Intelligence. Our intelligence services never had the opportunity to develop a political movement behind the Curtain, and even had they been able to do so it would have been practically impossible to maintain the kind of contact with them necessary to sustain their enthusiasm over the years. More important, with "Emilys" and "Mickys" being a dime a dozen behind the Curtain, there has been no need for Western intelligence agencies to go to the expense of developing "Philbys."

The "Philby" is not only peculiar to the Soviets; he is also peculiar to the "old espionage." Today, although the Soviets still waste considerable time and money on persons who just *might* one day work their way into targets of importance, they find that Philby's young counterparts are as anti-Soviet as they are anticapitalist and anti-"imperialist." Besides, these students seem incapable of sustained activity either as Soviet Intelligence agents or as employees of the targets they are supposed to penetrate. Still, the Soviets try—in American, British and European universities. Their success has been so slight that Western security agencies have all but discontinued their "doubling" of the few who succumb. Most are so feckless as counterespies that they could be of little help to the Soviets as spies. So why bother? "Philbys" are worth our serious attention only because a few older ones are *already* in our governments.

When "McCarthyism" was at its height, a sensationalist Washington columnist one day received a letter of unquestionable authenticity giving highly confidential information about the State Department's harsh treatment of employees accused of Communist sympathies. The letter was a violation of security regulations, but the intention behind it kept it from being a contravention of the nation's espionage laws. The writer had no thought of communicating the information to a foreign power, but only wanted to make the public aware of what he honestly thought to be an injustice.

Although the letter was signed simply "a patriotic American," it took only an hour or so of discreet inquiry for the columnist's chief investigator to determine the author's identity. Without informing the columnist of his intentions, the investigator approached the employee, swore him to secrecy, promised him monthly "expense money," and made arrangements for him to continue to indulge his patriotic impulses by furnishing weekly reports. Some of the reports would

be published as having come from "a source close to the State Department," with details altered to mislead the Department's security officials as they tried to run down the leak; the rest would be kept in the columnist's office as "background material" to support other stories. It was a satisfactory arrangement to both men—if not to the columnist, who was not told about it.

The investigator, it happened, was not only a reporter; he moonlighted as a "principal" of the Soviet KGB. As an investigator he was able to use the columnist's reputation as a crusader to employ informants. Some remained mere informants, happy in the belief that they were merely exposing to the public deficiencies of the bureaucracy. Others, after development, became regular Soviet agents—in other words, "Emilys."

Those who remained unaware that they were reporting to a foreign power were "Willies"—i.e., agents who don't know they are agents. They wouldn't think of working for an enemy government, but their sense of morality is not offended at the idea of furnishing information to private companies or individuals, or even to "friendly" governments. They grow like garden weeds at times when the public believes official-secrets acts are being used to hide the bureaucracies from well-informed criticism, and when for any other reason there is disrespect for security laws.

After the suspicions of the "Willie" have become aroused, he is, like any of the other types, more likely to continue his espionage work than to turn himself in. Most security officers believe that hundreds of uncaught "Willies" may exist in Western governments. Certainly thousands exist in governments of the so-called Third World, having been planted there not only by Soviet Intelligence but by our own intelligence services. They even exist in the Soviet Union. One "Willie" thinks he is giving tips to an industrial concern seeking government contracts; another, that he is giving information on his co-workers required for purposes of credit investigations; another, that he is keeping a right-wing religious group informed of "left-wingers" in his office. The stickiest "Willies" are those who think they are working for Congressmen or prominent newspaper columnists, because in many cases they *really* are—except for the fact that the principals who collect the information give it not only to their respective Congressmen and columnists, but also to Soviet Intelligence. In any case, termination of a "Willie" is normally awkward, as "termination with extreme prejudice" (i.e., liquidation) of "Willie" cases is frowned upon by most security services.

To the CIA's espionage specialists, agents can so easily be typed as "Emily," "Mickey," "Philby" and "Willie," that variations of these names are used to categorize new cases of foreign agents and even, sometimes, to categorize agents of our own. "We have managed to plant an Emily in the Algerian Foreign Ministry," a CIA espionage specialist might tell a colleague. The British have similar categories: so do the Soviets—although, of course, they are more in line with national characteristics. A review of the operational files of any espionage branch, however, would surely reveal that fewer than half its agents fit these categories. There is a wide range of agents who fit no category except "miscellaneous."

Even the most disciplined, textbook-minded espionage officers are occasionally unable to resist the temptation to recruit agents who do not fit the accepted patterns. For example, there is "that silly little sub-lieutenant," as British security officers call David Bingham, the Navy officer who had his wife "walk in" to the Soviet Embassy

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UP FRONT FOR THE CIA

by Robert T. Wood

Without Cloak or Dagger, by Miles Copeland. Simon and Schuster, \$8.95 (July).

in London to offer his services. Before the working day was over, the British security authorities knew of the approach and had set about making arrangements whereby Bingham would have access only to material, genuine and fake, that British Intelligence "disinformation" experts had cleared for passing. Meanwhile, the Soviets, presumably realizing that so naive an approach would have been spotted by British surveillance, only set up expandable operational facilities for the Bingham—and, no doubt, assumed that the material they delivered was generally fake.

Why did they bother? "The temptation to follow up on such an approach just to see where it will lead is irresistible," a CIA case officer once told me apropos of a similar case. "We spend far too much time on such matters." Why, then, do the courts make such a fuss over cases like the Bingham? There are a number of reasons, all centering around the fact that important detected Soviet spies rarely reach the courts, and it is essential to make the most of the "miscellaneous" ones who do. In sentencing Sub-Lieutenant Bingham, Mr. Justice Bridge of the Winchester Crown Court described the officer's action as "a monstrous betrayal of your country's secrets," adding, "The damage you may have done to these interests is incalculable," while counter-espionage analysts estimated that most of the Bingham's information could have been obtained by technical intelligence or inferred from overtly obtainable publications.

It is the fact that there are some "miscellaneous" agents (certainly more than the professionals think there should be), whom the courts are allowed, when they get caught, to make a fuss over, that gives writers of spy books and the general public the impression that they are what the espionage business is all about. Perhaps it's just as well. Many professionals no doubt think it useful for the public to have such a false impression. But there is one aspect on which I think it important that the public be set straight. This is that most spies are not oddballs like the Bingham. It is not their peculiarities upon which spymasters play to recruit them, but what CIA psychologists have come to call "normal vulnerabilities."

Why do spies become spies? I knew the original "Emily" very well; I knew the original "Mickey" to speak to, and he and I had many mutual friends; I knew at least three U.S. Government and two British Government employees who turned out to be "Mickys"; I knew the most famous of them all, Kim Philby, better than anyone else, excepting two or three British intelligence officers. I have also had in-depth interviews with a representative number of Soviet and Satellite defectors and former CIA and SIS agents who were recruited as they worked for official Soviet and Satellite agencies. Even so, I still have no firm views on what makes spies spy and defectors betray their countries.

And I don't think anyone else has. A review of the whole range of known spies and defectors shows that the ideologically motivated agent is a rare bird, indeed. Most espionage agents don't themselves fully comprehend what they do, and in most cases the very simplicity of their motivations makes them hard to recognize.

I believe that experience comes frighteningly near to indicating that as many as one out of three government employees who have passed all the security clearances might become, provided the right circumstances, agents of a foreign power. A CIA case officer confronted with a target within the Polish Government—to which only

MILES COPELAND is an old whore. This is not the libelous statement it seems, as anyone with Mr. Copeland's background well knows. In the Central Intelligence Agency, "old whore" is a term used to describe an officer so experienced, so devoted to his trade, so loyal to his organization, and so accustomed to following orders that he will accept and do a creditable job on any assignment without regard for moral, ethical, or possibly even legal considerations. Within the Agency it is a high compliment to professionalism.

No outsider can be sure Mr. Copeland qualifies for the title, of course, because the most ambiguous aspect of this latest book on the CIA is the status of its author. An alumnus of the wartime OSS, Mr. Copeland claims he served as a consultant to the newly formed CIA and was called back from time to time thereafter to review the systems he had devised. He never claims to have been a staff employee of the Agency, yet he says that espionage has occupied most of his working life. In 1957 he established himself in Beirut as a security consultant, which, he alleges, is still his occupation today, but his knowledge of the Agency and its workings is both intimate and up-to-the-minute. To ask Mr. Copeland when, exactly, his employment with the CIA ended might be a little like asking David Eisenhower how much rent he pays.

The temptation to compare Miles Copeland to Victor Louis is irresistible. A mysterious Russian who began as a small-time black marketeer moving about on the fringes of the foreign community in Moscow, Louis landed an assignment as correspondent for a London newspaper and made several trips outside the Soviet Union, rushing in to places, like Taipei, where Russian diplomats feared to tread. The speculation, which will probably never be confirmed, is that he obtained his unusual privileges and freedom of movement by virtue

Robert T. Wood worked for the CIA for seventeen years.

three persons have access—would be confident enough of penetrating it to assume success. Although we have no sure way of knowing, the converse is probably equally true. A CIA security officer once said, "Potential spies are at least as plentiful as po-

of his relationship with the KGB department of misinformation, whose mission it is to mislead the rest of the world concerning Russian capabilities and intentions. Like Victor Louis, Miles Copeland is a highly visible and easily accessible person of nebulous status who can go places and say things that responsible officials cannot. Mr. Copeland, who on at least one occasion has said things about CIA activities that responsible officials later had to deny, has been described by one journalist as "the only man I know who uses the CIA as a cover."

MR. COPELAND has written this book, he says, to counter a flood of misinformation on spies and counterspies that appears on television, in movies, books, magazine articles, and newspapers. To give him his due, there is more inside information on the subject presented here than has probably ever appeared publicly in one place. To begin with, Mr. Copeland makes it clear that espionage is a relatively minor source of intelligence information, although the clandestine services often seem to be the tail that wags the dog, and of course the descriptions of them make the best reading. His explanations of the planning and organization of a penetration operation and of the procedure for developing, recruiting, and handling an agent are in some cases over-elaborate and in others oversimplified, but generally they are accurate. The account of the position and operation of the CIA field station, cataloguing many of the problems faced by a CIA officer serving overseas, will be new to most readers and might even be instructive for foreign-service officers and foreign correspondents who thought they knew all there was to know. Add to this a text liberally salted with footnotes—most of them fascinating anecdotes in their own right—and the result is an interesting and readable book.

Unfortunately, the large quantities of good information in *Without Cloak or Dagger* serve as a vehicle for an equal amount of misinformation on the Agency, more misinformation, in fact, than all that's been produced by the movies, television shows, or publications that Mr. Copeland complains of. Moreover, the misinformation is presented very authoritatively, with no hint to enable the uninitiated to distinguish the true from the false. His intent, in a great many instances, is clearly to mislead the reader and give a totally false Agency capabilities

and performance.

In describing field operations, Mr. Copeland stresses their defensive nature, stating, with a certain candor, that "the mission of the CIA station is . . . to stay out of trouble." Most of the sixty or so stations around the world have, he says, no more than two or three case officers,* and, ideally, a case officer is responsible for no more than one operation. Contrasted with this low-profile view of the CIA overseas are his assertions of an impressive amount of successful activity. He claims that "over the years, there have been literally thousands of CIA agents in the U.S.S.R., Red China, Cuba and other communist countries," and that both agents and American personnel move easily and securely in and out of these "denied areas." The implication is that both Peking and Moscow are swarming with CIA spies and that no state secret is safe from them.

The facts as I was exposed to them were vastly different. In the days before I began to worry about becoming an old whore myself, I served for several years at a station with considerably more than three case officers. During one particularly hectic summer, I met regularly with and handled no fewer than twenty agents, one of them with an additional five subagents. My workload had been expanded by taking on handholding chores for some operations of my colleagues who were on home leave, but the average load for case officers is, I suspect, closer to twenty than to one. Even after I had achieved the relative luxury of handling only one fairly high-level agent, I continued to manage four or five other agents in support of my operation and other station operations, and I considered myself underemployed at the time.

It's embarrassing to admit that China was my primary target and all my best efforts resulted in not one penetration of the Chinese military, party, or government above the village level. The other case officers at the station were similarly unsuccessful, as had been every other case officer who had worked on the target for the previous twenty years. We consoled ourselves only with the knowledge that our colleagues in the units working against the U.S.S.R., with more personnel and more non-

ey and, presumably, more urgency, would have fared just as miserably but for the greater tendency of Russians to defect. Their one outstanding agent was not developed through any positive effort on their part; he had sought them out.

Early in the book, Mr. Copeland describes the CIA's arrest and physical elimination of a headquarters employee who had served for years as an agent for the Russians. If he expects anyone to believe this story, it must have occurred to him that he is confessing to a role as accessory to an administrative murder. The CIA has no police powers, let alone authority to act as judge and executioner as well. There are no doubt plenty of officers, young and old, who would not hesitate to carry out an execution if ordered, but it is incredible that there is a single administrator at any level of the Agency who would take the responsibility of ordering it. Although the Phoenix program, a wholesale assassination of key insurgent leaders in Vietnam, was directed by then Ambassador William Colby, it was carried out principally by the Vietnamese themselves, not by CIA officers. Phoenix had the full approval of higher authority, so the burden of Agency responsibility was minimal. It was not at all equivalent to the secret liquidation of one renegade staff employee in the basement of the Langley headquarters. If this incident had really happened, it would be foolhardy in the extreme for anyone involved ever to mention it; a second execution would be far more likely than the first was.

THE MOST IMAGINATIVE invention of the whole book is the cabal, or inner circle of Agency old-timers, who pop up to illustrate a point now and then. Known only by exotic names like "Mother," "Kingfish," "Jojo," and "Lady Windemere," they go on about the business of making the Agency run, regardless of changes in administration or policy. The last three of those mentioned, on the basis of their described responsibilities, appear to be no more than specialists in a single unit that supports operations without getting directly involved in their execution or command; these positions would not account for the importance or influence Mr. Copeland ascribes to them. Mother is the *éminence grise*. Like the others, he was present at the birth of the Agency, and, faced with the frustration of wondering what decisions the Congress was making for the future of the fledgling Central Intelligence Group, he characteristically suggested, "Penetration be-

gins at home," thus showing that intragovernmental spying was not an invention of the Joint Chiefs. It was also Mother who fabricated a complete espionage operation in those early days just to expose the gullibility of a unit competing with his for influence in the new Agency.

In spite of his early start and undoubted talents of maneuver, Mother somehow never made it to the top, but he enjoys a certain amount of autonomy today as head of the Agency's counterterrorist effort, a huge computerized data bank storing background information on millions of persons, both American and foreign, who could conceivably become involved in terrorist activity, as well as millions more who could not. Mother is, of course, an imaginary character, but, aside from that, there is no way for an outsider to judge the truth of the Agency's so-called counterterrorist activities. It is not legally authorized to keep files on American citizens. The significant thing is that the author wants his readers to believe it is doing so.

The CIA may well become the world's most powerful government agency, according to Mr. Copeland, because it has access to the most knowledge. Removing the dangers inherent in a powerful government agency, he adds, is not a matter of decreasing the power, but of ensuring that those who exercise it are incorruptible and truly responsive to public interest. "CIA officials believe that their agency is already incorruptible and . . . as responsive to public interest as any other agency." Interestingly enough, he does not claim anywhere that the Agency is responsive to higher authority. On the contrary, he gives examples where it has specifically been unresponsive and implies that it will continue to be so in cases where higher authority is in conflict with its own particular view of the public interest.

The overall picture that emerges from this book is of a Central Intelligence Agency enormously competent, frighteningly ruthless, spectacularly successful, terribly powerful, and absolutely trustworthy, the sort of ideal government organization that only a fool or a charlatan would tamper with. The author has composed a presentation that could completely revamp the Agency's image.

It has been apparent that ever since his days as executive director, William Colby has been trying to renovate his organization's image. The impression he wanted to project, as a friend of mine put it, seemed to be "something like a cross between General Motors and the League of

* Mr. Copeland corrects a popular misconception by explaining that staff CIA employees are almost never designated as agents, in the sense that FBI officers are known as "special agents." In intelligence an agent is someone, usually a foreign national, hired to provide information or perform other services. The staff employee who contacts and directs him, and in general handles his "case," is known as a "case officer."

Women Voters." There is an ominous implication in this book that, by improving the Agency's image, Colby intends to enhance its power and independence as well.

A great many people are going to take *Without Cloak or Dagger* seriously, but I doubt that anyone with the necessary authority will ask the Agency how much they had to do with it, or precisely what their relationship with Mr. Copeland is. Unlike the general run of Walter Mittys who claim to have some intimate relationship with the CIA, Miles Cope-

land clearly has one, but neither he nor the Agency is going to define it voluntarily. In the foreword, Mr. Copeland says, "I must make it clear, however, that no one at CIA... or any other official agency has 'cleared' this book or in any other way implied approval of my writing it." In early November of last year, I wrote a letter to Angus Thuermer, assistant to director William Colby, asking several very specific questions about the clearance of a magazine article that appears, in somewhat different form, as chapter nine of the book.

Mr. Thuermer's reply was unequivocal. "All Agency employees," he said, "sign secrecy agreements, and the federal courts have determined that the secrecy agreements are enforceable contracts." The actual review of manuscripts is a security function, and on that basis he declined to answer my questions, but if the man who sits next to the director of Central Intelligence admits he had the machinery to stop publication of this book and didn't, that should be approval enough for anyone. □

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS

26 MAY 1974

Sky Spies: New Breed of Super Snoops

By JOSEPH VOLZ

Of The News Washington Bureau

THE GREAT OLD legends in spying, people like Mata Hari and Richard Sorge, are being eclipsed by a new generation of super snoops with names like "Cosmos" and "Big Bird."

The man in the trench coat and the beautiful seductress coaxing secrets out of government big-wigs are being automated out of jobs.

At the Central Intelligence Agency in the Washington suburb of Langley, Va., hundreds of clandestine operatives, known as "spooks" in the trade, are being asked to take early retirement. The reason: spy satellites, used by both the Soviets and the United States, can now uncover military secrets that an army of humans might never unravel.

The Soviets reportedly have rocketed at least 10 radar satellites into earth orbit in the last four years, operating over the Indian Ocean and the Baltic Sea.

Threat to Polaris?

Although the Soviet program is still considered experimental, with the satellites staying up for only a few weeks at a time, the sky spies pose a potential threat to the previously invincible U.S. Polaris submarines. The Cosmos satellites may be attempting to find U.S. subs deep in the ocean by detecting the heat given off by their engines.

Pentagon sources also believe that the Soviets are experimenting with satellites that can detect even the smallest amount of radioactivity coming from the nuclear subs.

Until now, the Navy has boasted that only its missile-carrying subs could hide successfully from the Soviets, that land-based U.S. Minuteman missiles or bombers can easily be targeted.

The Soviets also fired off a barrage of spy satellites last year over the Israeli-Egyptian battlefield. Unmanned Voshkod satellites, big enough to carry two men, were launched to snap pictures of the battlefield at noon under good lighting conditions.

The U.S. Air Force, very hush-hush about its own satellite program, reportedly launched some Midcast spy satellites from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif.

This kind of technological wizardry can hardly be matched by an agent on the ground, who may spend years winning the confidence of government bureaucrats before gaining access to military secrets. And espionage experts wonder if the value of the information that only human spies can collect—such as urine samples of foreign leaders—is worth the effort and the cost.

Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger dispatched a batch of spies and dirty tricks experts into retirement during his brief tenure as CIA director last year.

Of course, the espionage game will always need humans and, occasionally, a spy can work his way into the confidence of an important world leader. The most recent success story was Guenter Guillaume, the East German spy who served as aide-de-camp to West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. Guillaume's arrest last month led to Brandt's abrupt fall from power.

A major drawback to human spy missions is the risk of being caught, confessing, and embarrassing the folks back home. Francis Gary Powers, for example, was shot down while piloting his U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union in May, 1960, and a planned Soviet-U.S. summit conference blew up as a result of the uproar after the Russians captured Powers. The capture of the spy ship *Pueblo* off North Korea in 1968 caused more problems for the United States when the crew was forced to "confess." Satellites, of course, can't be tortured.

Air Force Secretary John L. McLucas is particularly interested in satellite technology, but greets questions about sky spying with a smiling "no comment." However, it is known that the Air Force has been in the spy satellite business for quite some time.

Four years ago, for example, the Air Force fired off the first of a series of satellites from Cape Kennedy equipped with tv cameras and x-ray sensors to watch over the Soviet Union, China and North Vietnam. The satellites were designed to give early warning of any enemy missile shots from land or from subs. The sensors can detect the exhaust of a rocket fired off a launch pad, and the cameras can snap pictures of troop movements or missile sites.

In recent years, the U.S. has been developing expensive satellites like Lockheed's Big Bird which can stay up for months. But the Russians have been firing off more satellites, according to Pentagon sources.

There are still some bugs to be worked out of the satellite programs, as Gregory R. Copley of Defense Foreign Affairs Digest reported recently. The Cosmos satellites used by the Russians during the Arab-Israeli conflict "apparently did not transmit their photos back to earth via electronic means but in capsule form" by parachute. This kind of delivery is too slow for rapidly developing battlefield conditions.

MAY 22, 1974 **FEDERAL TIMES****CIA Pushes Jobs Equality****Secrecy vs. Passing the Word**

By Beth Price

Special to Federal Times

WASHINGTON — The super-secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), located in a Washington suburb, is in a vise of its own making: Namely, how to promote equal employment opportunity programs at the agency without blowing their cover.

Like all federal agencies, the CIA is under orders to increase the number of minorities, especially blacks, and women employed at most levels of the agency.

But unlike other federal agencies, the CIA shuns publicity and cherishes its low profile. The less said about the international intelligence-gathering agency, the better, most officials would agree.

Behind the fenced and tree-barricaded grounds, leading up to the massive white headquarters building just off Route 123 in McLean, Va., several CIA employees are trying hard to attract more blacks and women especially for professional positions. And trying equally hard to be quiet about it.

They're mulling the problem of how to clear up some of the misconceptions blacks and others have about the CIA and how to get some of them to apply for jobs. This they want to do without letting on to too many people exactly how many blacks they want, how many they have now, or what the agency needs them for.

The same quandary is met with the CIA's women employees. Although the problem isn't to hire more women, because the percentage of women is relatively high, there is a dilemma when it comes to promoting women into executive positions or moving them into male-dominated departments.

Where does the CIA find the qualified women and yet keep quiet about their efforts to do so?

The director of equal employment opportunity at the CIA, a

white male who asked not to be named, has attempted to find one solution to the recruitment problem. He has opened up a walk-in office in Rosslyn.

Without seeking publicity about it, he and his staff, who also asked not to be named, try to encourage people of minority races and women to drop in and inquire about possible employment at the CIA.

The Washington Area Recruitment Office of the CIA is located at 1820 N. Ft. Myer Drive, Rosslyn. The phone number is 703-351-2028, and interview hours are 9 a.m.-3:30 p.m.

But despite this unmasked outpost, the CIA still has a long way to go in its recruitment program. One complicating factor is the necessity of reducing the work force at the agency, which means that some people are being laid off and some positions are going unfilled at the same time that the agency is trying to attract blacks and women.

The percentage of blacks employed there is just over five percent. For women, the figure is 32 percent. However, the figures are incomplete because the CIA won't reveal how many people altogether work for them.

To recruit more blacks, the EEO director said, a black assistant will be hired soon.

Other efforts have included importing 25 black college professors to CIA headquarters for a tour and to show them that much research and analysis goes on there. Not all CIA work is clandestine or police-like, the EEO director said.

The agency is preparing a brochure for its recruiters to hand out, "describing the true nature of agency missions and functions, etc., in order to dispel misconceptions of agency employment among minority groups," the EEO director said in his 1974 affirmative action plan.

By 1980, the CIA hopes to have a black employee percentage of 8-9 percent, according to the EEO director.

There's no problem with the number of Orientals employed at the agency, and the situation with Spanish-surnamed employees is "uncertain, . . . We're looking into it now," according to the EEO director.

Many women at the CIA are underemployed, that is, clustered at grades 5-9, often in clerical or secretarial positions.

The main thrust of the women's panel at the CIA is to promote more women into upper-level positions, not necessarily to hire more women. The women's coordinator, a white, said: "We're not after promoting unqualified people. We're after equal opportunity, not more equal."

She's hoping to set up some programs that will help women get into "bridge jobs" and then onto the career ladder.

To accomplish its 1974 affirmative action goals, the CIA is trying to bring more blacks into its summer intern programs and into its work-study programs for college students.

The agency also is encouraging its employees to persuade their black friends to consider employment at the CIA.

This however becomes rather difficult for some employees who are instructed to be discreet, if not secretive, about their place of employment.

The dilemma in which the CIA finds itself is highlighted by a remark in the 1974 affirmative action plan. One of the agency's objectives, according to the plan, is "to participate in community efforts to improve conditions which affect employment in the federal government."

Commenting on that objective, the EEO director wrote: "For security reasons, CIA is unable as an organization to participate in many activities and programs not connected with its sensitive mission. Employees, however, are encouraged to participate in civic activities as private citizens but maintaining al anonymity if"

WASHINGTON POST
13 MAY 1974

Wallace R. Deuel, Correspondent, Central Intelligence Agency Aide

Wallace R. Deuel, 63, a former newspaper correspondent and Central Intelligence Agency aide, died Friday while en route from Washington to Chicago on a private ambulance plane.

Mr. Deuel, who lived at 1605 45th St. NW, suffered from emphysema and had been in failing health for the past three years. He was planning to stay with his son, Peter M. Deuel, in Chicago.

After extensive reporting experience abroad, Mr. Deuel was diplomatic correspondent in Washington for the Chicago Daily News from 1945 to 1949 and then for the St. Louis-Post Dispatch for the next four years before he joined the CIA. He retired in 1972.

Born in Chicago, Mr. Deuel was graduated from the Uni-

versity of Illinois in 1925 and for the next three years taught political science and international law at the American University in Beirut, which then was part of Syria.

He joined the Chicago Daily News in 1928 and for a period wrote "think" pieces on the Middle East before moving to the paper's New York bureau.

In 1932, he was assigned to Rome, where he wrote numerous stories on the developing Fascist regime.

Mr. Deuel became chief of the Berlin bureau of the Chicago Daily News in 1935. His dispatches on the Nazi regime appeared not only in the Chicago Daily News but also in many other papers throughout this country.

He covered the campaigns of the German armies into Poland and other areas of Western Europe and in 1942 pub-

lished a book, "People Under Hitler," considered one of the best accounts of Nazi Germany.

In 1941, Mr. Deuel had been given a leave of absence by the Chicago Daily News to serve as special assistant to Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, director of the Office of Strategic Services, forerunner of the CIA.

He was with Gen. Donovan until 1945. He was also a special assistant to Ambassador Robert J. Murphy, serving as political adviser on Germany to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower at SHAPE headquarters in 1944-45.

Mr. Deuel had received the Sigma Delta Chi Award in 1947 for his excellence in reporting.

In addition to his son, he is survived by a sister, Susan Shattuck, of Urbana, Ill., and seven grandchildren.

WASHINGTON POST
15 MAY 1974

Col. Donald W. Bernier, Military Intelligence Expert on Russia

Retired Army Col. Donald W. Bernier, 61, a retired military intelligence officer who specialized on Russia, died Sunday of cancer at his home, 6307 Orchid Dr., Bethesda.

Born in Chicago, he graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1935 and served with the infantry in this country and Hawaii before transferring to the Military Intelligence Service in 1940. Two years later he received a master's degree in Slavic affairs from Harvard University.

Col. Bernier was assigned to Europe and North Africa as well as to the War Department here during World War II.

His assignments included that of chief of counterintelligence under the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence in the European Theater of Operations and chief of the Russian Liaison Section of Allied Force Headquarters. He helped organize the military element of the Allied Control Commission for Italy.

Reporting back to the War Department in 1944, Col.



DONALD W. BERNIER

Bernier was chief of the Russian branch in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and later was deputy chief of the Eurasian branch.

He was a War Department delegate to the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in 1947 and later served as assistant military attache in Moscow.

After further service in Czechoslovakia, Col. Bernier

returned here as assistant chief of staff for plans and operations of the Army Security Agency. In 1953 he was named chief of the parliamentary staff of the Central Intelligence Agency.

He then saw duty in Alaska and Ohio, and in 1956 came back to Washington as deputy director of the Army's Foreign Intelligence Office.

In 1961, Col. Bernier became a special Defense Department representative to the Coordination Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence, a position he held until retirement from the military in 1965.

He then worked as a research scientist at American University until 1972.

Col. Bernier's decorations included the Legion of Merit.

He is survived by his wife, Loretta, of the home; two sons, Bruce, of Bethesda, and Maj. Barre Bernier, of the Presidio, San Francisco; two brothers, Maj. Gen. Joseph Bernier, of Bethesda, and Gordon, of Green Bay, Wis., and a sister, Dorothy Coan, of Chicago.

GENERALNEW YORK TIMES
30 May 1974

The Meaning of Torture

By Anthony Lewis

BOSTON, May 29—The use of torture as a political instrument is an evil beyond justification or compromise, a practice officially condemned by every civilized society. Yet it goes on, in many places around the world, and arousing people's interest in the subject is singularly difficult. Perhaps we find the reality so unbearable that we turn away rather than contemplate it.

Such thoughts are provoked by fresh reports on the savagery practiced by the military junta in Chile. Evidence of torture in Chile has been published by, among many others, Amnesty International, the highly-respected group that favors no ideology except humanity. Amnesty's findings are summarized with telling simplicity in an article by Rose Styron in *The New York Review of Books*.

Victor Jara, a folk singer, was held with thousands of others in a Santiago sports stadium. He was given a guitar and ordered to play. As he did, the guards broke his fingers, then cut them off. He began to sing, and they beat and then shot him. Several witnesses have described that death. It is a relatively mild example of what Mrs. Styron relates.

Many reports tell of the use of electric shock to make prisoners "confess" to what their captors desire. Sexual assault is a common theme. Mrs. Styron mentions a women's prison, Casa de Mujeres el Buen Pastor, where young girls are sent from prison camps, pregnant, "with their hair pulled out and their nipples and genitals badly burned."

At least one complaint of such treatment has been made officially in the Chilean courts. Mrs. Virginia Ayress complained that her daughter, Luz de las Nieves Ayress, had been beaten, sexually abused, tortured with electric currents and—in a scene right out of "Nineteen Eighty-four"—had rats and spiders put on and into her body. The courts forwarded the complaint to the armed forces.

People are arrested, tortured and summarily killed in Chile for any reason or no reason. Large numbers of doctors have been arrested, some because they did not join in a strike last summer against the leftist Government of Dr. Salvador Allende. Amnesty has an appeal from Chilean doctors saying that 85 of their profession are in prison, held without any charges; another 65 are said to have been shot or died of torture or untreated wounds.

Last month the 28 Roman Catholic bishops of Chile, in an unusual public statement, condemned the practice of torture and arbitrary arrest. The junta routinely denies torture reports or, in the words of its Interior Minister, Gen. Oscar Bonilla, dismisses them as

ABROAD AT HOME

"damaging to the national interest."

But what has all this to do with the United States? Secretary of State Kissinger has told us that this country cannot reform the internal policies of other governments. As a generality that is fair enough. But it is not enough when we have a share of responsibility.

However much the Allende Government contributed to its own downfall, the United States made things worse by cutting essential economic assistance—except to the Chilean military. Since the coup, Washington has given strong support to the military regime. Unlike other Western countries, we have offered no asylum to Chilean refugees. And we have said nothing, officially, about the murder and savagery.

Words would matter in this instance. If the United States spoke out against the torture, if our Embassy in Santiago was active in watching the trials and other visible manifestations of oppression, if more American lawyers joined international legal groups in protesting the junta's lawlessness, if Congress moved to attach conditions to aid, those who rule Chile would almost certainly listen.

But the present Government of the United States shows no concern for human rights. Henry Kissinger and his President were silent for months while their allies in Pakistan slaughtered the Bengalis. Washington has nothing to say about a Greek Government that rules by terror. Or about the Government of South Korea, whose kidnappings and brutalities make Communist regimes look almost decorous by comparison. (For a student to refuse to attend class in South Korea "without plausible reasons" is a crime punishable by death.)

Some of the nastiest governments in the world today were born or grew with American aid. That being the case, the most modest view of our responsibility would require us to say a restraining word to them occasionally. But we say nothing, we hear nothing, we see nothing.

There was a wonderful example the other day—funny if it did not involve so much suffering. The State Department said it knew of no political prisoners in South Vietnam, because Saigon's stated policy "does not permit the arrest of anyone for mere political dissent." Thus the thousands of non-Communists in South Vietnamese jails were made to vanish, the twisted creatures in tiger cages waved away. Thus the idealism that once marked America's place in the world has become indifference in the face of inhumanity.

NEW YORK TIMES
27 May 1974

The Poppies of Anatolia

A totally unnecessary confrontation is brewing between the United States and Turkey; unless it can be talked out in terms of reason and good will, serious resentment could erupt to jeopardize Western security interests in the eastern Mediterranean.

The issue is the cultivation of poppies for opium, banned by the Turkish Government since 1971 after lengthy discussions with the United States. Under nationalistic political pressures at home, the new Turkish Government is giving serious consideration to lifting the ban. Against such a possibility, demands are being raised in Congress to suspend all economic aid to Turkey, a drastic move which could weaken the Turkish commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Both sides have a grievance in this complex misunderstanding. For American authorities the Turkish ban is central to the increasingly successful campaign against heroin addiction. United Nations and Federal Government drug enforcement authorities point to a dramatic decrease in the amount of illicit heroin reaching the streets of New York and other Eastern seaboard cities; an estimated 80 per cent of heroin formerly came from Turkey through the illicit "French connection" network. Though there are other potential sources of raw opium—particularly Southeast Asia—international efforts there have scored notable success in disrupting new illicit channels of supply.

From the Turkish point of view, however, the ban has been a deprivation for some, for others a provocation. Poppies are a traditional and legitimate crop for a small but real segment of Turkey's farm population—not for opium but for the edible oil, seeds and stalks. The \$36-million American aid program to compensate Turkish farmers for lost income has, by all accounts, failed—little of the money ever reaching the farmers themselves. Turkish anger has been aroused by misleading reports that the United States is encouraging opium production elsewhere, for pharmaceutical needs. Fortunately an official plan to cultivate poppies in this country for that purpose has been definitively shelved. Some Turkish politicians have turned the ban into an emotional issue of national pride.

The way out of this apparent impasse lies not through threats and acts of national defiance by either side. If the American aid program has been ineffective so far, it should be revised and strengthened—not necessarily with more money, but by better implementation, including small-scale industrial projects to convince the Anatolian farmers, and their mentors among the politicians, that they have something to gain by abandoning their poppy crop.

The Turkish government has already shown readiness to remove one irritant to Turkish-American relations; an amnesty measure has reduced the life sentences passed on several young Americans arrested in possession of drugs, though the remaining prison sentences may still seem excessive to many in this country. With a modicum of good will, and recognition of each other's legitimate concerns, there is no reason why both sides cannot benefit from continuation of the Turkish poppy ban.

THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
16 MAY 1974

Nerve gas plans worry Europe

America's European allies are becoming increasingly disturbed at the prospect of military deployment of stockpiles of a new type of nerve gas, the Government here has admitted.

In addition, arms control authorities in Washington believe that the production of the nerve gas in the "binary" form could damage, or even permanently ruin, the current Geneva negotiations on banning chemical weapons. The Pentagon's controversial plans for producing the gas would thus appear to be heading for trouble.

Binary gas is composed of two chemical agents, each relatively harmless, which become a lethal gas only when combined.

The Administration's first admission of the European disquiet over the probable use of binary nerve gases came yesterday, on the final day of Congressional hearings into current US chemical warfare policy.

Mr Leon Sloss, a senior State Department official with responsibility for military policy, told

From SIMON WINCHESTER, Washington, May 15

a subcommittee on national security policy that "our NATO allies are less than enthusiastic in accepting binaries. It is our judgment that any effort to deploy or expand our overseas stockpile or to increase the number of sites would run into serious diplomatic difficulties."

Mr Sloss declined to tell the Congressmen anything more yesterday. "I would need to go into executive (private) session before I could go into the views of the Europeans any further," he said.

After the hearing, however, he did say that the British view on binary nerve gases — which he hinted was not overwhelmingly enthusiastic — had now been communicated to the American delegates to the Geneva conference in the past months. He said that most opposition in Europe would result from any increase in the size of America's nerve gas stockpile; were it to be retained at the same size as present, "there may be trouble . . . but I can't really say."

The development of binary

nerve gases has been going on in American military laboratories for the past decade. Basically, the technology that has now been developed by scientists working at the Pine Bluff arsenal in Arkansas, enables the well-known and extremely deadly nerve agent GB, or "Sarin," to be stored safely in the form of two relatively innocuous chemical agents which will only produce the lethal gas when combined.

Currently, the Pentagon would like to fill stockpiles of 155 millimetre howitzer shells with the two precursors: once fired from a gun the two substances combine, and GB is released on impact.

The argument advanced in favour of binary gases is that they are much easier and safer to store and transport, and that their development will alleviate much of the public fear of the siting of present stockpiles, such as the huge nerve gas dump at Tooele in the Utah desert.

The Pentagon currently considers its nerve gas stockpiles — which it keeps purely, it

says, for their deterrent function — are inadequate, and it would like to deploy binary gases in a wide variety of tactically useful places. Europe, where the 115mm cannon would be a prime defence against potential Communist military activity, is the natural first choice.

At present there is believed to be just one nerve gas stockpile in Europe. This is thought to be at Hanau, near Frankfurt, on the site of an old Second World War cyanide store. There are seven storage sites on the continental United States, and one reserve stockpile on Johnston Island in the Pacific. The Pentagon, bowing to public pressure, is reducing its stockpiles of GB and VX at some sites — such as at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal near Denver, where nerve gas canisters and bombs lie at the end of the main airport runway.

At the same time the Defence Department is organising a discreet public relations exercise to convince the public that development of binary gases is both necessary and, in the long run, more safe.

NEW YORK TIMES
27 May 1974

Anarchy in Energy

There is no such thing as energy policy in Washington today. The most that the Administration and Congress alike have been able to muster all these months is a series of ad hoc responses to crises as they develop, followed by deterioration and disinterest in executive and legislative branches when the specific crisis fades:

- The White House moves to speed up licensing procedures for construction of nuclear power plants; but no one has figured out how to resolve the acute shortage of skilled labor needed to build the plants — and that is turning into the real bottleneck, even for those who harbor no practical or environmental doubts about the wisdom of relying on nuclear power.

- The Administration calls for the expansion of coal production, but the manufacturers of mining equipment are already well behind in meeting present demand, with limited capacity for expanding their production. Without more mining equipment there cannot be more mines.

- Oil men are urged to increase their rate of exploration, but once they designate new sites to drill, they face months—even years—of delay in getting delivery of the steel pipe with which the drilling is done.

- Private capital is about to launch an oil shale industry in Colorado, after years of false starts, but there won't be much point in that—quite apart from the potential environmental damage—if the pipeline to distribute the finished product is not authorized and built.

- The Secretary of Commerce, Frederick B. Dent, says that American business could save nearly a quarter of the nation's oil consumption by conservation methods using present technology; but the Government has yet to employ anything more than appeals to patriotism to encourage revising and retrofitting of industrial plants.

- Reliance on the price mechanism to bring fuel supply and demand toward balance has a certain philosophical attraction, but neither the Congress nor the Administration has found the way to alleviate the added burdens of fuel costs on the poorer segments of the population, who already pay a disproportionate share of their modest incomes for energy.

These are typical of the inter-related problems which turn the making of energy policy into something requiring far more coordination than the Administration has yet been able to provide. More than forty Federal Government agencies, bureaus and commissions play their separate and distinct regulatory roles in energy policy-making, often in ignorance of what the others are doing, and without any clear guidelines of national policy against which to measure their individual decisions. Yet concrete proposals to bring a semblance of order into the decision-making process have repeatedly fallen to the bottom of bureaucratic in-boxes to languish unimplemented and possibly unread. Such seems to be the fate of the ten-month study directed by Atomic Energy Commissioner William O. Doub completed last month. Though commissioned by the White House, this comprehensive organizational plan is being rapidly buried, under official explanations that the energy crisis has passed and things seem to be working well enough as they are.

Things are not working, either toward the stimulation of new energy supplies or the encouragement of energy conservation. The only movement in the legislative and bureaucratic morass seems to be that of shifting hierarchies and jockeying for jurisdiction. Anyone seeking an example of what happens to an administrative structure without adequate direction from the top can simply observe the fate of energy policy in the post-Watergate

Western Europe

BALTIMORE SUN
23 May 1974

CIA data said to call Bonn aide Red spy

By GENE OISHI

Bonn Bureau of The Sun

Bonn — West Germany's politically charged atmosphere sparked still another security controversy yesterday with the news that a magazine intended to publish an alleged Central Intelligence Agency study identifying the West German chief of internal security as an East German or Soviet spy.

In the wake of the spy scandal that led to the resignation of Chancellor Willy Brandt, news of the magazine's intentions prompted immediate high-level inquiries between Bonn and Washington.

Afterward, the Bonn government announced that Kenneth Rush, deputy secretary of state, informed the German ambassador in Washington that "the story contained not one word of truth, the article is completely unfounded and that the American government categorically denies it."

The target of the scheduled article, Guenther Nollau, the 67-year-old chief of the West German internal security agency, taking a cure at a health resort near Munich, called the magazine report "rubbish" and "lies." He said he intended to take all possible measures, including legal action, to prevent publication of the article, scheduled for next week.

Ferdinand Simoneit, chief editor of *Capital*, the magazine, in question, said in a telephone interview that he fully intended to publish the article as scheduled.

He declined to say where the magazine got the alleged CIA study, but said that it was from sources who in the past have proved to be reliable. He said the material was checked out with former West German in-

telligence operatives, including Reinhard Gehlen, former chief of West Germany's foreign intelligence service.

On the basis of these checks, he said, the magazine decided there was something to the alleged CIA study.

According to the article, the CIA has discovered that Guenther Guillaume, the personal aide to Chancellor Brandt who was discovered to be an East German spy, was one of four agents in high-ranking government positions.

According to the article, Guillaume, who only ranked No. 3 in importance among the four, was sacrificed in an effort to divert suspicion away from more important spies, one of whom was Mr. Nollau.

The diversionary tactic did not work, the article states, because it was determined that East Berlin was getting information that had to come from

a better placed spy than Guillaume.

The agitation in Bonn over the intended article was attributable no doubt in part to the fact that *Capital* specializes in economic matters and is not normally given to sensationalism.

Mr. Simoneit, the editor, said he was informed yesterday by a "middle man" that Chancellor Helmut Schmidt wanted to meet with him later in the day, but no time was set.

Mr. Schmidt, meanwhile, reportedly had an emergency meeting with Werner Maihofer, the new interior minister, and Klaus Boelling, the new government spokesman, over the matter.

Shortly afterward, the American Embassy announced there was no such CIA study as mentioned by the magazine. Later, the embassy spokesman

said flatly that no member of the West German internal security agency, officially called the federal Office for the Defense of the Constitution, has been under suspicion or under investigation by the CIA.

With the U.S. Embassy statement in hand together with the State Department denial in Washington, the chancellor apparently decided that a meeting with the *Capital* editor was not needed. The government announced last night that no such meeting was planned.

Mr. Nollau, the West German security chief, came to West Germany from East Germany as a refugee in 1950 and worked ever since for the federal agency that he now heads. He was made chief of the agency in 1972, despite charges from some quarters that he could be a security risk.

NEW YORK TIMES

27 May 1974

Leftists Bid Lisbon Free Cuban Officer

Special to The New York Times

LISBON, May 26 — Soldiers used tear gas tonight to disperse a crowd of ultraleftists, including many black Africans, who were demonstrating for the release of a Cuban Army officer captured by Portuguese forces during operations against guerrillas in Portuguese Guinea.

The military authorities ordered broadcasting stations here not to report on the matter. But two independent Lisbon radio stations issued protests against what they termed censorship.

The Cuban, identified as Capt. Pedro Rodriguez Peralta, 35 years old, was captured in the rebel-held territory of Portuguese Guinea in November, 1969. He was sentenced here in June, 1972, to 10 years and a day in prison for his alleged role, advising the rebel movement.

Captain Peralta was released from prison earlier this month under an amnesty and transferred to the officer's wing of Estrela Military Hospital, on a hill here. He is being treated for what is described as a sore arm and is still under detention.

Last night, participants in a

leftist protest against continued fighting in Portugal's African possessions marched to the hospital in western Lisbon and started an all-night vigil, shouting, "Free Comrade Peralta."

Army military policemen kept the demonstration under control. Late last night, five armored cars were posted at the approaches to the hospital. They were withdrawn this morning.

A police officer told the demonstrators early today that the Cuban was being detained "because of strong national interests" and could not be released at once.

The officer added that Captain Peralta's status would be cleared up by international negotiations, and denied rumors that the Cuban would be exchanged for an agent of the United States Central Intelligence Agency. The protesters disbanded this afternoon.

Lisbon newspapers asserted last week that Washington had asked Portugal to request the release of a C.I.A. agent, identified as Lawrence K. Lunt, who was serving 30 years in a Cuban prison, in exchange for Captain Peralta.

The Cuban chargé d'affaires in Lisbon is scheduled to begin talks with Portuguese officials about Captain Peralta in a few days.

NEW YORK TIMES

27 May 1974

GERMAN MAGAZINE CANCELS SPY REPORT

BONN, May 26 (UPI)—In the face of a threatened lawsuit and of denials by the West German and American Governments, a West German magazine today canceled plans to publish a report that the United States Central Intelligence Agency considered the chief of West Germany's Intelligence Service a Communist agent himself.

Ferdinand Simoneit, editor of the business monthly *Capital*, said that further research had cast "serious doubt" on the report that C.I.A. agents here had informed Washington that they believed that Guenther Nollau, director of the federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, might be an agent for East Germany.

Mr. Nollau threatened to sue and he and the two governments denied the report four days ago when Mr. Simoneit announced that he intended to publish it.

"New information has cast serious doubt on the authenticity of the paper which was said to be a private study made by the C.I.A.," Mr. Simoneit said. "Capital will not publish the article about Nollau."

WASHINGTON POST
24 May 1974

Lisbon Officer Questions Long-Term U.S. Intentions

By Miguel Acoca

Special to The Washington Post

LISBON, May 23—Despite indications that the U.S. government approves the goals of the new Portuguese junta, some young officers who carried out the last month's coup are suspicious of long-term American intentions.

One of these officers has charged that large numbers of U.S. Central Intelligence Agency operatives have been active in Portugal in recent weeks, not just in Lisbon but in the northern industrial center of Oporto.

The officer, who was among founders of the Armed Forces Coordinating Committee that led the coup, also charged that the CIA maintained a communications vessel called "Apollo" off Lisbon.

They refused to provide names of the alleged CIA agents but said that Portuguese military intelligence has a list of names. In making the charge, he gave credence to similar allegations by the Central Committee of the Portuguese Communist Party.

Americans here dismissed charges of CIA activity on the ground that such allegations are a standard ingredient of leftist propaganda.

President Nixon, it was pointed out, has sent friendly notes to President Antonio de Spínola and Prime Minister Adelino Palma Carlos. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger also has privately messaged

Foreign Minister Mario Soares, and U.S. Ambassador Stuart N. Scott was the first diplomatic chief of mission to call on Spínola after the general became chairman of the military junta.

The coordinating committee source made clear that the armed forces movement wants to cooperate with the United States and said he wondered what "so many CIA agents are doing in Portugal." He said that the seven-man military junta, which remains in power as part of the Council of State, does not wish to antagonize the United States.

He indicated that for this reason the Cape Verde Islands, strategically located 300 miles west of Senegal in the Atlantic Ocean, would not be included in the cease-fire talks which are to begin Saturday in London between Portugal and the PAIGC, the liberation movement of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.

The 10 islands, with a population of 250,000, could serve as a naval and air force base in the South Atlantic. The United States and NATO have repeatedly turned down offers to set up a base on Cape Verde.

In his writings, Gen. Spínola has declared that Portugal could not permit the Cape Verde Islands, which lie on the sea lane plied by supertankers loaded with Middle East oil bound for Europe and the United States, to fall into

Communist hands.

That Cape Verde was not part of the London negotiations with PAIGC was confirmed by Soares in an interview published yesterday. There is no doubt that this relieved serious American concern about the future of the islands.

Not so clear, however, is the future of Nacala, potentially the best deep-water naval harbor on the Indian Ocean shores of Mozambique where Frelimo guerrillas have been waging a successful insurgency.

Although the military and civilians in the new Portuguese government are confident that Frelimo will accept their offer of immediate cease-fire talks, the liberation movement has yet to indicate a willingness to negotiate.

Long before the coup, Portugal offered Nacala to the United States as a base site but the offer was declined. The Portuguese even asked the U.S. ambassador to visit the harbor, but the invitation was rejected allegedly because of political implications in Africa and the Middle East.

But the situation has changed radically since the April 25 coup — even though the U.S. embassy appears to have reported as long ago as early March that young officers who wanted to end the colonial war were preparing to topple the dictatorial regime.

The embassy is thought to

have predicted the abortive March 16 uprising, which coordinating committee members have characterized as a dry run to determine the reactive capacity of the deposed government.

It is unclear whether the embassy was aware of the April 25 drive and of the armed forces program, which was in preparation since last September. But there is no doubt the embassy was surprised by inclusion of two communists in the Cabinet and that it is skeptical about the cohesiveness of the present coalition.

The U.S. base at Lajes, in the Azores Islands, is deemed crucial to any U.S. effort to supply Israel by air, as occurred during the October Middle East war.

For the past few years the United States, concerned about the adverse effect of Portugal's colonial war on Western European allies and on the newly independent African states, prodded Portugal to find a peaceful solution to the fighting in Africa.

According to the Coordinating Committee source worried about the CIA, the United States was an ambivalent ally when Portugal had the will to fight and, now that Portugal wants to halt the war and create a democracy, the CIA is snooping around.

"It is very hard for us," he said. "We wanted the U.S. to define itself then, and we want the U.S. to define itself and its aims now."

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
10 May 1974

BONN SPY SCANDAL TWENTY-YEAR TRAIL OF BLUNDERS

By DAVID SHEARS in Bonn

WEST GERMANY'S spy scandal, which toppled Herr Brandt from his pedestal, is a tale of blunders and contradictions, personal innuendos and misleading official statements.

The skein of this stranger-than-fiction plot is made up of piquant stories of Herr Brandt's personal indiscretions as well as the classic material of spy novels—codes, Nato secrets and

clandestine letter-drops.

Its ramifications cover two decades of history and stretch from Moscow to Washington by way of a lonely cabin in central Norway.

Perhaps Ginter Guillaume was not the most dangerous spy in post-war history. He was not, like Fuchs or the Rosenbergs, arrested for passing atomic secrets to Russia. But his role as one of Herr Brandt's trusted personal assistants certainly makes him a "big fish" in espionage annals.

Essentially the Brandt-Guillaume affair raises three basic questions:

1. Why was a man already known to have been a Communist agent allowed to penetrate the Federal Chancellery?
2. Did Herr Brandt continue to trust his aide even after the warnings from security agents?
3. How much of a role did fear of disclosures about his pri-

vate life play in the Chancellor's decision to resign?

The answers are emerging only by instalments from a fog of confusion. But at least this much of the picture seems clear.

Warning signs

Firstly, when Guillaume was being screened for his Chancellery job at the turn of 1969-70, there were several signs that he was a security risk.

The Federal intelligence service (BND) told the Chancellor's security chief that its dossiers showed Guillaume to have worked for the East German publishing house "Volk und Wissen" in 1954-55, just before coming to the West as a "refugee."

In this capacity, the BND reported, Guillaume had travelled in the West seeking to infiltrate West German publishers.

Herr Ehmke, then the minister in charge of the Federal Chancellery, ordered further inquiries which produced on Jan. 27, 1970, the reassuring conclusion from the Office for the Protection of the Constitution that there was no reason to deny Guillaume a job handling papers marked "secret."

Former agent

Guillaume had also been named by a semi-private West Berlin intelligence organisation, the Committee of Free Jurists, as a former East German agent.

Herr Ehmke confronted Guillaume with these charges during an interview on January 7, 1970 and naturally Guillaume denied that he had ever been an intelligence agent.

Herr Leber, Bonn's present Defence Minister, wrote a warm testimonial to his Social Democratic party colleague, praising his "reliability" and "devotion to freedom and democracy." The upshot was that he was cleared to handle "secret" and later "top secret" material.

German newspapers are asking why the Federal Chancellery failed to follow the BND's advice and insist on a more thorough investigation. Did Herr Ehmke override the objections to Guillaume out of loyalty to a party colleague?

There is little doubt that Guillaume enjoyed the support of influential Society Democrats in Hesse, the state where he had posed as a fervent party worker.

Secretary a spy

But this is not all. Unmentioned in the official 16-page documentation on Guillaume's screening was that while working in the party's south Hess branch he engaged a secretary named Ingeborg Sieberg who was uncovered in 1966 as a spy.

Yet there is no sign that this episode—which must surely have figured in the files—was even considered when Guillaume was checked in 1969-70.

Small wonder, then, that Herr Ehmke was forced two days ago to renounce any claim to a seat in the next Bonn cabinet. But Herr Genscher as Interior Minister is also under a cloud, not to mention Herr Leher who wrote the testimonial letter.

Both men are nevertheless assured of portfolios in the Schmidt administration due to take office in a week's time. Herr Genscher cannot be dropped because he is in line to succeed Herr Scheel as leader of the Free Democrats, junior partner in the coalition, when the latter is elected to the presidency.

Thus the new government will inevitably start out still bearing some of the odium of the Guillaume affair.

Contradictory stories

To the second basic question, the extent to which Herr Brandt continued to confide in Guillaume even after the warnings that he was a security risk, the ex-Chancellor himself has given contradictory accounts.

In his television broadcast on Wednesday night he admitted that while in Norway last summer he had let Guillaume see secret documents. Less than two weeks earlier he had assured parliament that Guillaume had not been entrusted with secret files "because this was outside the scope of his duties."

Bonn Government spokesmen insisted at first that Guillaume had been cleared to handle only "secret" material, but later conceded that he had been given access to "top secret" papers.

Just when the counter-espionage authorities told Herr Brandt his aide was under suspicion has not been officially revealed. But it was certainly in the spring of last year, and one account gives the date as May 29.

The Chancellor was sup-

posedly advised to keep Guillaume in his job and to go ahead with plans to take him to Harmar in Norway, where Herr Brandt's Norwegian-born wife owns a lakeside holiday home.

Nixon letter

Yet Guillaume was the only staff assistant to accompany the Brandt family on this month-long holiday in July. German reports say that Herr Brandt allowed the following papers to pass through Guillaume's hands:

- 1 A letter from President Nixon outlining suggestions for reorganising Nato.
- 2 Other Nato and state secrets, transmitted between Bonn and Hamar in code over a direct teleprinter line, seen by Guillaume after decoding.
- 3 Confidential position papers and memoranda concerning Ostpolitik relations with East Germany and Moscow. It was these to which Herr Brandt was referring, when he said he had felt constrained in his East European policies as a result.

- 4 Personal exchanges between the Chancellor and other heads of government. Letters to other Socialist party leaders such as Mr Wilson would have crossed Guillaume's desk in any case because of his capacity as liaison man with party headquarters. The question remains unanswered: Why did Herr Brandt open the floodgates of state secrets to a suspected spy? Was the Chancellor so trusting that he simply refused to believe his security advisers until they brought conclusive proof of Guillaume's guilt?

French-discovery

According to *Quick* magazine of Munich, an anti-government weekly reputed to have good contacts with the BND, French secret service agents had uncovered Guillaume's spy activities as early as September 1972.

Its report yesterday quoted French sources as saying that a Russian KGB defector named Vadim Belotzerkovsky had recognised Guillaume in a TV film of Brandt with his aides. The Russian had leapt to his feet and cried: "That man was with me in the Kiev Military Academy!"

If this is true, it raises still

more questions. Why was Herr Brandt not told immediately about the French suspicions, instead of being kept waiting until the following May? Or did not the French inform their German counter-espionage colleagues?

One theory voiced by *Quick* is that the French kept quiet because they found it useful to tune in to Guillaume's secret radio transmissions. But this is dismissed as absurd by Allied intelligence sources in Bonn.

Der Spiegel, another German magazine, claims that the French knew as early as 1970 that there must be a spy in Herr Brandt's vicinity.

They had learned from an East German bank employee who had defected to the West that someone in the Bonn Chancellery was being paid monthly sums through a secret account. They did not at that time know his name.

This same report says that BND files dating back to 1956 showed the existence of an agent whose first and last names both began with "G"—but even after Guillaume had come under suspicion nobody had thought of the connection.

Praise overdone

Whether the full tale will ever be told is unlikely. But from all these and other reports it seems that Herr Genscher's lavish praise as an Interior Minister for the detective work of his counter-espionage sleuths was somewhat overdone.

The final question is the most delicate of all: The issue of Herr Brandt's private life and the possibility of blackmail.

In his broadcast the former Chancellor said one reason for his resignation was fear that "my private life would have been dragged into speculation" concerning the spy case. But at the same time he repudiated as "grotesque" any suggestion that a Chancellor could be blackmailed, least of all himself.

Bonn is rife with rumours and innuendos which have been circulating for years. In this respect West Germany is no different from other capitals—published gossip about an alleged affair between the late President Kennedy and Marilyn Monroe being just one example.

Near East

Sunday, May 19, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST

U.S. Navy Still Pressing For Base in Indian Ocean

By Judith Miller

The writer is Washington correspondent for The Progressive magazine.

AN AMERICAN naval base in the Indian Ocean is an idea which has been patiently awaiting its time. For more than 15 years, Pentagon and Senate leaders have blocked the Navy's efforts to establish a permanent naval presence in the area, but this year, the Navy's plan to build a base on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia may finally outlive its opposition.

The Navy now argues that the prospective reopening of the Suez Canal will lead to an expansion of the already impressive Russian naval presence in the area and that such a prospect necessitates immediate congressional approval of \$32.3 million to expand the Diego Garcia facility.

Public testimony and secret correspondence between the Pentagon and Capitol Hill, however, indicate that these supposedly "new" factors justifying an expanded U.S. presence on Diego Garcia are little more than rationalizations for the Navy's persistent expansionist aims in the Indian Ocean.

Specific plans for a more permanent naval presence in that area date from the late 1950s. Retired Rear Adm. Gene La Rocque, who now heads the Washington-based Center for Defense Information, recalls that in the early 1960s, the Navy wanted to station naval forces in six islands, including Diego Garcia. According to a State Department official, the U.S., fearing a political vacuum after the British withdrawal from commitments "East of Suez," persuaded Britain in 1965 to form the British Indian Ocean Territories (BIOT), an administrative entity including Diego Garcia and several other Indian Ocean islands.

The real purpose of these territories became clear the following year, when the U.S. and Britain signed an agreement making BIOT available for the defense needs of both governments.

According to former State Department intelligence officer John Marks, the CIA was an enthusiastic supporter in the mid-1960s of a permanent U.S. presence somewhere in the Indian Ocean since it was assumed that when China tested an ICBM, it would do so in that area.

Project Rest Stop

IN TESTIMONY before a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee, former Pentagon systems analyst Earl Ravenal said that the proposal to build a base on Diego Garcia first emerged in the Defense Department in the summer of 1967, but was rejected. Senate staff aides recall that the Navy proposed the Diego Garcia base in 1968 to then Armed Services Committee Chairman Richard Russell, but failed to win his support.

In 1969, a proposal for a Project Rest Stop—the construction of a \$26 million "austere naval facility"—appeared as a classified line item of the fiscal year 1970 military construction budget. The project was approved by both House and Senate Armed Services Committees, but the authorized funds were deleted by the Senate Appropriations Committee.

In an attempt to save the project by having the funds reinserted during House-Senate conference, then Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Thomas Moorer appealed to Senate Armed Services Chairman John Stennis in a letter dated December, 1969. Moorer, expressing "deep concern" over the status of the classified Diego Garcia project, claimed that deletion of funds for the base would have an "adverse strategic effect of major importance." According to Moorer, the Diego Garcia base was "the Navy's number one priority of all items" in that year's military construction program.

At about the same time, the Navy sent a memo to the Senate Armed Services Committee stressing the strategic importance of the support base's construction. The Navy argued that the base would provide the President with "a range of involvement options from no involvement to whatever involvement is deemed necessary."

The Navy memo further noted that Diego Garcia, if necessary, "could be quickly converted for use of Polaris submarines." The justifications cited in the memo for an Indian Ocean naval base are identical to those expressed now: increasing Soviet presence and Chinese influence and the vacuum created by British withdrawal from the area.

Despite Moorer's attempts to solicit Stennis' aid, efforts to save the project were not successful, and Project Rest

tempted the next year to secure funds in the FY 71 budget for Diego Garcia expansion. This time, it requested \$18 million for a smaller-scale "communications facility," involving radar and satellite operations, supposedly intended to replace the National Security Agency installation at Asmara, Ethiopia.

Congress approved the request, an agreement was signed with the British and the Navy began building a communications facility which included construction of naval support base infrastructure: harbor, roads, an 8,000-foot runway and permanent facilities for 250 men.

Talking to Moscow

AT THE SAME time, the National Security Council staff issued two secret National Security Study Memoranda highly critical of plans for such expansion. The memoranda, dated Nov. 9, 1970, and Dec. 22, 1970, concluded that the U.S. had minimal strategic interests in the area and that those limited interests were not amenable to protection by military intervention. The memoranda encouraged the government to seek an agreement with the Russians to limit American and Russian naval deployments in the area.

The Soviets did approach the U.S. about such an agreement privately in early 1971. In June of that year, Soviet leader Brezhnev again referred in a speech to the possibility of naval deployment negotiations in the Indian Ocean. The U.S. approached the Russians three months later but failed to pursue the matter vigorously, claiming that "clarification" from the U.S.S.R. had not been forthcoming.

Congress now is considering the Pentagon's request for a \$32.3-million expansion for the communications facility into what the Navy calls an "austere" support base—virtually the same proposal it rejected in 1970.

The House recently approved, but the Senate deferred action on, the \$29 million sought for Diego Garcia expansion in this year's supplemental military authorization bill. Having failed to slide the funds through in the supplemental without much debate, the administration is preparing for the coming confrontation with the Senate over the base.

The Navy is refining its rationale for the base. In Senate hear-

ings this March on the supplemental request, Pentagon and State Department witnesses stressed the Soviet buildup in the Indian Ocean. Though State officials continue to emphasize Soviet expansion of facilities at Berbera, Somalia, administration officials recently have been softpedaling the Soviet menace argument. Instead, they are stressing the "flexibility" Diego Garcia would provide the U.S. in its efforts to "reinforce" diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East through a naval presence.

The National Security Council is preparing yet another National Security Study Memorandum, one which re-evaluates American strategic interests in the Indian Ocean in light of recent events in the Middle East and attempts to justify the Diego base expansion.

Administration officials now argue that funding the base expansion might actually induce the Russians to consider Indian Ocean arms limitation negotiations seriously, since a base in Diego Garcia would give the U.S. the option of matching Soviet ship levels in the area.

A "Zone of Peace"

OPPPOSITION to the project, however, appears to be growing. The Diego Garcia base is opposed by nearly all of the nations bordering—the Indian Ocean, most of whom support a United Nations resolution aimed at establishing a "zone of peace" in the Indian Ocean. In addition to India, which has recently denied Soviet requests for port facilities, traditional U.S. allies such as Australia and New Zealand have criticized the planned expansion.

Britain apparently also is having second thoughts about the project. According to a State Department official, the U.S. and Heath governments negotiated and agreed in principle to a new supplemental executive agreement authorizing construction of the base, but, at last report, the new Wilson government still withheld its approval. State Department officials are confident, however, that Britain eventually will sign the agreement rather than risk losing American assistance in modernizing its strategic defense system.

Several senators, however, are attempting to use the Diego Garcia expansion to express opposition to executive agreements in general as opposed to treaties, which require Senate approval. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recently approved an amendment to the State Department-USA authorization bill requiring that any agreement on Diego Garcia with Britain be approved by Congress.

The Navy has pegged the project's urgency to its prediction that Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean will increase markedly when the Suez Canal reopens. Pentagon critics La Rocque and Ravenal contend that, in times of conflict, reliance on waterways as vulnerable as the Suez Canal makes no military sense.

In addition, in a recent issue of the Economist, a British magazine which consistently supported U.S. policy in Vietnam, the Pentagon's claim that current Soviet naval deployments are greater than that of the U.S. is termed misleading. The magazine reports that both France and Britain have been increasing their deployments to the area and that combined U.S., British and French forces outnumber Russian deployments.

Moreover, in a secret memo sent to a Senate committee only a year ago, the Pentagon acknowledged that, though the Soviets have had naval forces in the Indian Ocean since 1968, only once, in December, 1971, during the India-Pakistan war, did Russia deploy major combat forces there. Soviet naval presence in the area, according to the memo, is designed primarily to "show the flag." It further noted that most of the Soviet ships in the area are merchant vessels, hydrographic research ships and vessels being tested in tropical environments.

Opponents like Ravenal and La Rocque argue that construction of the Diego Garcia base would goad the Soviets into further strengthening their forces, since they now lack reliable and secure shore-based support facilities in the area comparable to what is planned for Diego Garcia.

Costs and Carriers

ONE OF THE strongest but least discussed arguments against the project, however, is its direct and indirect cost. About \$65.3 million already has been spent on construction and operation of the current Diego communications facility. In the next two years, the Pentagon is requesting \$37.5 million for construction and equipment and another \$78 million for Navy Seabee pay and support for the planned expansion. But the total construction and operations cost of \$180.1 million is minuscule compared with the cost of a single additional aircraft carrier.

Despite Pentagon denials, critics of the expansion argue that, if approved, the base will be used by the Navy to justify aircraft carrier construction at a time when current plans call for reduction of the active force to 12 attack carriers. Frequent naval visits to the area since the October Middle East War already have resulted in postponement of the retirement date of two carriers.

The Navy has claimed that it intends to keep a carrier task group in the Indian Ocean for only six months of the year. During hearings on the supplemental request for Diego Garcia funds, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Moorer assured Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) that no new additional carriers would be needed to keep a carrier task group in the Indian Ocean for six months of the year.

It is doubtful that U.S. expansion in the Indian Ocean can be stopped. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger announced in December that the U.S. would re-establish the pattern of regular U.S. Indian Ocean vessel visits which were disrupted by the Vietnam war.

Although the Pentagon agreed to close the Asmara communications post in order to gain approval in 1970 of the facilities on Diego Garcia, Pentagon spokesmen recently testified that Asmara was being phased down, but not phased out.

Congress, however, can stop the expansion of the planned support base on Diego Garcia, which many see as the beginning of a permanent U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean—a presence which could stimulate yet another arms race in another part of the world.

BALTIMORE SUN
28 May 1974

Tass says Israel bars emigration

Moscow Bureau of The Sun
Moscow—The Soviet Union, which has a backlog of an estimated 120,000 applications from Jews wishing to emigrate, accused Israeli authorities yesterday of forbidding people to leave that country.

A commentary distributed by the official news agency, Tass, declared that many persons, particularly recent immigrants to Israel, "express a desire to leave but the authorities do not permit them to do so."

Tass attributes the desire to leave to Israel's economic difficulties and emphasizes the number of American Jews who are leaving.

BALTIMORE SUN
24 May 1974

India's current plight called worst since

By ARNOLD R. ISAACS
Sun Staff Correspondent

New Delhi — "This is the worst time of our history since independence," a prominent Indian social scientist said recently.

The same sentiment is echoed all across India. S. Bhoothalingam, a prestigious economist, wrote in his economic journal *Margin* that 1973 opened in "gloom and anxiety" to become "among the worst if not the worst" year in recent history and that 1974 promises to be no better.

A teacher in Calcutta says that the current crisis "is the worst we have had," and a foreign economist long involved in Indian affairs remarks: "My knowledge of India goes back a long time and it's never been worse."

India's ills include unprecedented inflation, economic stagnation, growing hardship among the people and political unrest reflecting a massive loss of confidence.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's government is facing a national railway strike, the most serious expression so far of worker discontent and one which could have disastrous effects on the economy.

The national malaise is all the more acute because it has overtaken the country only a bare two years after what was perhaps the high point of India's 27 years as an independent nation.

Harvests had improved

In 1971, the country had just decisively defeated Pakistan in war. It had enjoyed three successive good harvests, and with yields improved by "green revolution" techniques was in striking distance of being self-sufficient.

Grain imports that year were less than half-million tons, compared with an average of 3 to 5 million in previous years, and India was even able to offer food aid to the new state of Bangladesh. Indians optimistically concluded that their chronic food problem had been beaten at last.

Mrs. Gandhi, whose ruling Congress party had been returned to power the year before with a sweeping victory by Indian political standards, raised hopes with her promise to abolish poverty and social injustice.

The euphoria did not last long. The summer monsoon in 1972 failed and crops were affected disastrously, with total grain production in 1972-1973 falling by 15 million

below the peak two years earlier.

Prices shot up, the government had to go back on the world market for grain imports, shortages developed and an ill-conceived effort to nationalize the grain wholesaling system proved a costly failure.

On top of the food crisis came the world oil crisis, driving up living costs even more sharply and affecting such crucial economic sectors as transportation, power and fertilizer.

27 per cent cost rise

The official cost-of-living index rose 27 per cent in a year, far exceeding any increase in post-independence Indian history.

Economists generally agree the impact on the urban civil servant and the industrial worker—the bulk of the middle class—is far worse than the official figures indicate. The inflation is expected to continue at least at the same rate for this year.

The hardships of the urban middle class make up one of the principal reasons why the current crisis seems different, and possibly more disruptive, than past crises in India's history.

About 80 per cent of India's 585 million people live in the country's half-million villages, not entirely unaffected by modernization but still molded in the traditional peasant culture which accepts good and bad years fatalistically.

The 20 per cent who live in cities and towns, however, have had their expectations raised. "By and large these people have witnessed a very steady improvement in their living standards," Sawar Lattef, the respected economic correspondent of *The Statesman* of New Delhi, says.

It is these people who bear the brunt of not only the inflation but also the sluggishness of the economy.

Unemployment rise

A recent government economic survey reported that unemployment soared from 5.8 million in June, 1972, to 7.6 million a year later—and in India, as in all underdeveloped countries, the unemployment rate means principally that of the modern, urban sector of the economy.

The "educated unemployed"—those with high school diplomas or better—rose from 2.6 million to 3.5 million in the same period, representing a potentially explosive reservoir of social discontent.

Major disorders, in

broad popular support, broke out this year, first in the relatively prosperous state of Gujarat and then in Bihar, one of the poorest states in the country.

The government has attempted to portray the disorders as the work of its political adversaries. But most observers feel that they are massive, spontaneous uprisings against not only economic hardship but also against government institutions that seem too inefficient, too corrupt, and too unconcerned with the enormous problems of the people.

Everyone concedes that Mrs. Gandhi cannot be blamed for the weather or the oil crisis. But she is charged with mismanagement and with a failure to persuade Indians that their sacrifices are being met by concern and competence in their leadership.

Uttar Pradesh election

The government's attempt to take over grain distribution was a shambles, and finally had to be abandoned this year. Nationalized industries on the whole are doing poorly. There was little or no increase in production in major industries in 1973, and there is little improvement so far in 1974, with production impaired not only by poor management but worsening power cuts and transportation difficulties.

The slide in Mrs. Gandhi's popularity, or at least in public confidence in her government, was reflected in the voting earlier this year in her home state of Uttar Pradesh, a mammoth, poverty-ridden state with a population of 80 million, more than all but seven of the

1947

world's independent countries.

Her Congress party had won 43 per cent of the Uttar Pradesh votes in 1971—a sizable victory in India's fragmented political system. This year it received only 32 per cent, and barely held control of the state legislature; the voting turnout was reported extremely low, suggesting that many Indians simply have turned off all political leaders.

Pained defensiveness

Government leaders tend to react with pained defensiveness to the charges hurled at them.

"We are being charged that India has not developed, is not doing anything," said Mohan Dharia, the minister of state for planning.

"But the country has progressed. Since 1947 we have raised agricultural production from 55 million tons to 110 million tons.

"In 1947 we weren't prepared to produce a bicycle without some foreign components; today this country produces motorcars, trucks, railway locomotives and airplanes. A whole infrastructure has been erected. Is this a record without positive achievements?"

Acknowledging that social and political unrest are growing, Mr. Dharia said, almost plaintively, "Should we not be credited for struggling to preserve a democratic system? That has made our struggle more difficult. It is very easy to impose discipline in dictatorship, in a fascist system. It is not so easy in a democratic system."

NEW YORK TIMES
19 May 1974

ISRAEL CRITICIZED ON WAR ESTIMATE

Failures in Evaluation Laid
to Intelligence Service
Prior to Conflict

By DREW MIDDLETON

Israel's intelligence service, in the past regarded as the best in the Middle East and the equal of larger services, is under severe criticism because of its failure to assess correctly Arab intentions before the October war last year.

United States civilian and military intelligence communities, including a task force at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., have studied with dismay the errors of Israelis in evaluating their own information and the material made available to them by Western intelligence services.

Information now available shows that as early as Sept. 24, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, which specializes in electronic intelligence, were convinced that a major Arab attack was coming and warned Israel. The Israeli command rejected the warning.

This rejection is in accord with the attitude of Israeli intelligence throughout the pre-war period.

An official Israeli Government report, issued after a lengthy inquiry, blamed Maj. Gen. Eliahu Zeira, the director of military intelligence, and Brig. Gen. Arich Shalev, his principal assistant, for a "totally insufficient warning" of the Egyptian and Syrian attacks on Oct. 6.

From all accounts, Israeli, Arab and neutral, it appears that the Israeli intelligence service was locked into a doctrine that held that Egypt would attack only if she had enough air power to knock out the Israeli Air Force, and its bases.

No Aerial Preparation

Egypt and Syria attacked at 2 P.M. on Oct. 6 without the expected aerial preparation. Not until 4:30 A.M., the official report said, did military intelligence tell the Government that war could be expected that evening.

The commission of inquiry, headed by Dr. Shimon Agranat, president of the Supreme Court, found that "a doctrinaire adherence" to the aerial preparation theory was at the bottom of the failure to evaluate correctly warnings from the Suez Canal front.

Egyptian operational plans

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
20 MAY 1974

Hope Cooke left Sikkim after spy charges: king

NEW DELHI, India, May 19 [AP]—The King of Sikkim said today that Hope Cooke, the debutante who became his queen 11 years ago, moved back to New York after opposition politicians accused her of being an American spy.

But King Palden Thondup Namgyal, 49, said that he hopes his wife will return to Sikkim some day.

The king was considered a living god and undisputed ruler in his Himalayan land until a political uprising in April, 1973, reduced him to a figurehead.

MISS COOKE, 33, left Sikkim a few months later. Ever since, the official story has been that she went to New York only to enroll her two

children in school and to arrange medical treatment for the king's daughter by his late first wife.

Friends of Miss Cooke in New York said the former debutante does not plan to return to Sikkim. But they said there is no immediate talk of divorce and the king agreed.

"There is no question of divorce or anything like that," he said emphatically. "I have not run away with another woman nor has she run away with a man."

THE REAL REASON his wife left, he said, was that she was hurt by allegations that she was trying to exert American influence on the landlocked Indian protectorate of 200,000 inhabitants.

"She had done a lot for Sikkim," the king said. "She developed Sikkimese textbooks, which are being published by Oxford University. But our opponents said she was trying to introduce American textbooks and an American education system in Sikkim."

"She also had assisted some students to go the United States on some visits. But all this became distorted. The allegations were very wrong and unfortunate. Naturally, she was not used to these political thrashes, where she was variously called a CIA agent or an American spy. She felt hurt, and that was to be expected. I'm hurt myself, but that is part of my job."

close to the canal.

By Oct. 1 the amount of Egyptian military traffic picked up by listening stations maintained by Israel in the Sinai desert had surpassed that recorded in previous maneuvers.

At the same time pictures from the American satellites showed that the Egyptian concentration was on a far larger scale than anything in the past.

A Lieutenant's Report

The intelligence service could not be diverted by alarming reports from junior officers. Early in October Lieut. Benjamin Siman-Tov, reporting on Egyptian Army movements, told Lieut. Col. David Gedaliah, the southern command intelligence officer, that on the basis of his analysis the Egyptian maneuvers were being used only as camouflage for a preparation for a general offensive.

The commission of inquiry found that Colonel Gedaliah, in reporting to the southern command, "erased the penetrating questions" posed by Lieutenant Siman-Tov "which could have raised doubts as to the evaluation of the Egyptian deployment as an exercise."

Colonel Gedaliah explained that the junior officer's view contradicted that of the intelligence service which he and the commander in the south, Maj. Gen. Shmuel Gonen, both accepted.

Africa

WASHINGTON POST
22 May 1974

David B. Ottaway

Disaster in the Desert

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has recently issued a report that amounts to a searing indictment of the international community in general and the U.S. Agency for International Development in particular for their failure to prevent the death of untold thousands in the now 5-year-old drought in Africa. The report raises a major issue: Is there an international moral imperative to save lives that overrides even the prerogatives of national sovereignty?

The drought afflicting the African Sahel, that 2,500-mile belt of near-wasteland just south of the Sahara Desert, has galvanized the world commu-

crity from crop production to population censuses and often slow-moving local bureaucracies.

They are even aware of the thornier moral and political issues. At one point, they ask:

"What responsibility did the Africans have to distribute relief supplies equitably? What international presence, if any, did massive outside relief obligate the Africans to accept in order to assure the international community that the aid was used properly?"

The two authors continue:

"Was it possible, in the midst of crisis, for the African states to suspend for a time some of their sovereignty to help save their own people? Or would the unpleasant political subjects, as for AID policy-makers, have to be someone else's problem?"

These questions are never answered. Yet they have been far tougher to deal with than most of the physical obstacles. While the international relief agencies have had their share of failings, which have accounted for many needless deaths, the drought-stricken African nations have been responsible for many more because of stubborn pride over their national sovereignty.

The problem was no better illustrated to this correspondent than in Mali last summer when thousands of nomads, having lost their camels and other animals, began to congregate around the few small remote towns, particularly Timbuktu, in the northern part of the country.

At one point, I visited Timbuktu to find that food supplies were scarce indeed and medical provisions practically nonexistent. Famine-weakened nomads, particularly the children and elders, were dying from diarrhea provoked by American-supplied sorghum which they had never before eaten. Yet there were food and medical supplies stocked in the Malian capital of Bamako, the United States had three C-130 transports shuttling relief goods about the country and there were foreign medical experts available to help.

The problem lay less with AID or the United Nations than with the Malian government, which was determined to run the relief campaign itself and would brook no outside interference in its internal affairs. The more outsiders pushed, prodded and criticized, the more irritated and stubborn the Malians became.

It was not that the Malian government was doing nothing. It had already mobilized its army and even its prisoners to help get relief supplies distributed to the distant north. But its sense of priorities did not always match those of foreign relief workers, nor did its judgment of the seriousness of the situation.

The issue of national sovereignty is no less burning for being 10 years

older in black Africa (most of the countries there gained their independence in the early 1960s). This is certainly understandable given most black African states' prolonged and often bitter experiences under Western

"Hordes of well-meaning outsiders have descended upon these hapless countries in an effort to save their peoples from starvation."

colonial rulers and the fact that Western and Eastern aid "experts" are still trying to tell them how to run their economies and governments.

The drought seems even to have quickened the issue as hordes of well-meaning outsiders have descended upon these hapless countries in an effort to save their peoples from starvation. In some cases, governments have sought to hide the seriousness of the drought from the outside world, sometimes out of legitimate fears of damaging the tourist trade and sometimes out of a more selfish concern for possible political repercussions at home. (The drought has been a major factor in the fall of both the Ethiopian and Niger governments already this year.)

The Carnegie report argues in effect that the solution to the problem of national sovereignty, as to all the failings of the relief agencies, is international sovereignty. It proposes the establishment of a supra-national relief organization incorporating an early warning system and standing facilities for rushing supplies to the disaster area and then monitoring the equitable distribution of food.

But that such a super international relief agency would be any better equipped morally or politically to deal with national sovereignty than AID or the FAO remains doubtful in this writer's opinion. African governments have shown no less sensitivity and resistance to the proddings of U.N. officials than to those of U.S. or French diplomats.

It might, however, eliminate some of the petty jealousies and rivalries among Western governments, and between them and those of the Communist East, that has been responsible for some of the disorganization in the international relief effort in the Sahel. Any steps that can be taken to save lives in times of natural disaster would certainly be welcome in Africa as elsewhere in the world.

The writer covers Africa for The Washington Post.

nity into mounting an emergency relief effort the likes of which that neglected continent has not seen since the civil war in Nigeria. Some \$340 million has been spent so far on food and medical supplies to keep alive several million nomads and peasants living even in the best of times on some of the world's most wretched earth.

Nonetheless, thousands have died, many of them needlessly. Why has this happened?

Roger Morris and Hal Sheets, the two authors of "Disaster in the Desert, Failures of International Relief in the West African Drought," tell us it was because of a "pattern of neglect and inertia within U.S. and U.N. agencies, first in spotting the approaching calamity and then in administering relief to the millions of victims.

"An administrative and bureaucratic disaster was added to the natural calamity—inevitably at a higher cost in human lives and suffering," the report charges. Both AID and the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization were "haunted by rudimentary failures to heed early warnings, to plan in advance and to monitor and coordinate the rescue efforts."

The 66-page report is relentless in its pursuit and expose of the rivalries, jealousies and inadequacies of international relief agencies in their handling of relief operations in the Sahel. But it seems excessively belligerent and unusually sparing in complement toward organizations that nonetheless managed to save several millions of lives under exceptionally difficult circumstances.

The authors seem well aware of the physical handicaps under which relief groups are operating: few coastal ports capable of handling supplies, rudimentary inland rail-and-road systems, almost meaningless guestimates of ev-

Far East

WASHINGTON POST
22 May 1974

Decries 'Punishment' of Ally

Schlesinger Defends Viet Aid

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger argued yesterday that South Vietnam does not deserve to be punished because of American disaffection over its own involvement in the long war in Southeast Asia.

The United States, he said, still has an "implicit commitment" to South Vietnam, although in a narrow military sense neither South Vietnam nor Southeast Asia, for that matter, were essential to U.S. national interests.

The commitment, Schlesinger added, required the United States to keep shipping needed quantities of military supplies to Saigon.

"We told them they were going to do the job and we would supply the tools. Now," he added—referring to pending congressional cuts in the aid request—"there is some question about whether we are going to do that."

"Surely," the defense chief went on, "after all of the involvement in South Vietnam, the South Vietnamese deserve something better than a retroactive punishment for our having gotten involved in the war on their side."

"If we continue to give them support and they fail to survive," Schlesinger said, "that's a different issue from pulling the support out from under them."

"It is unworthy of us," he told newsmen, "in my judgment, to behave on this issue in such a niggling manner."

The Pentagon civilian boss met with reporters at breakfast yesterday, just hours before the House of Representatives was slated to vote on a

proposal to slash further the Nixon administration's latest request for military aid for Saigon. The vote was postponed.

The "niggling manner" that Schlesinger was referring to involves a proposed cut of \$700 million in the Pentagon's request for \$1.6 billion in new military aid for Saigon for fiscal 1975, which begins July 1.

The Defense Secretary's point was that in the context of a total defense budget request of \$92.6 billion and in comparison to the \$28 billion a year the United States was spending on the war at its peak (which he said would cost \$50 billion today), the amount of new aid was relatively small.

Congress, however, appears headed on a different course. Last month, legislators rebuffed a Pentagon attempt to raise the ceiling on Vietnam aid for the current year above the \$1.1 billion level to which it had been originally cut.

Then the Senate Armed Services Committee chopped the new fiscal 1975 request down to \$900 million. The House Armed Services Committee had only reduced the \$1.6 billion request by \$200 million, holding out the prospect of a compromise somewhere in between. But the amendment now pending on the House floor would match the Senate panel's \$700 million reduction.

Pentagon critics argue that Saigon's armies have traditionally wasted vast amounts of U.S. ammunition and supplies. They also argue that increasing aid rather than cutting it would signal South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu to continue indefinitely—at U.S. expense—with military rather than political

solutions to his problems.

Schlesinger agreed yesterday that the "real issue" in the current debate is the "signals we are giving to both North and South Vietnam." But he added that the congressional cuts would lead to dangerous interpretations in both capitals.

He claimed the image of "prodigal" wasters of ammunition is "not based on observation but on presupposition," and that Saigon's army has been on "strict rationing" of fuel and ammunition in recent months.

Calling attention to what he describes as "Massive" violations by Hanoi of the Paris cease-fire agreements, Schlesinger argued that the continuing fighting in the south is not a result of "undue aggressiveness on the part of Thieu."

From a purely military or tactical standpoint, Schlesinger conceded under questioning, U.S. national security would not be disadvantaged by what happens now in Vietnam.

"Aside from these intangibles" of a moral commitment for support, he said, "I would not describe South Vietnam or Southeast Asia as an area of the world in which our national interests are high."

But even some congressional critics privately concede that the "intangible, implicit commitments" Schlesinger mentioned will continue to provide Congress with a dual dilemma: What happens if the aid is slashed further and the fighting goes on by both sides to Saigon's disadvantage? How much real defense does a certain level of aid actually buy?

Schlesinger said he was un-

certain about what the impact might really be if a \$900 million level were approved. He envisioned some morale problems and some "gradual" reductions in Saigon's million-man army and its equipment level.

He said the United States could continue supplying "significant" quantities of consumables such as ammunition, but probably would not be able to continue replacing major equipment on the one-for-one basis permitted by the Paris accords.

Under questioning, Schlesinger expressed the "feeling" that the administration's Watergate problems with Congress had spilled over to some extent onto the Pentagon's Vietnam requests.

"It's plain that in regard to our legislation on the Hill, that present discontents are not particularly helpful to gather up votes necessary to get the bills across."

"Nor," he added, "is there enormous speed over there (at the White House) with regard to processing whatever it is the White House is processing. Their attention is diverted."

Privately, White House officials, including Vice President Ford, have been critical of Schlesinger for his handling of the Pentagon requests which were cut on Capitol Hill.

Schlesinger also sought to correct his own earlier indications that as much as \$6 billion extra may have been allowed to remain in the defense budget by the White House to pump up the domestic economy.

He said about \$1.5 billion in actual spending was retained, equal to perhaps \$2 billion to \$3 billion in obligational authority.

NEW YORK TIMES

23 May 1974

Use of U.S. Funds For UNICEF Helps In Hanoi Is Barred

By KATHLEEN TELTSCH

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., May 22 The United States insisted today that its money should not be used for aid that the United Nations Children's Fund provides for North Vietnam and for Communist-controlled areas in the South.

The American decision, was passed along to UNICEF's board by Michael N. Scelsi, the United States member, who said it reflected Washington's "deep disappointment" that the Communist authorities lacked genuine commitment to see the Indochina conflict settled peacefully.

Although the United States is the largest single contributor to the aid agency, Washington's decision would not block the undertaking. It will, however, require that the agency use other financing for these specific projects.

The Children's Fund, which

has been providing help on a nonpolitical basis to more than 100 countries, has had a significant aid program in South Vietnam since 1956.

Board members were eager to provide the same type of aid but Hanoi has been reluctant to accept a UNICEF operation last year.

The agency will spend a total of \$44-million over the next three years for aid in Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Some \$18-million will be spent in North Vietnam, mainly to rebuild primary schools and \$4.5-million in Communist-held areas in

South Vietnam, mainly for health services for children and for shelter. About \$11.2-million will be spent in South Vietnam for health, education and water supplies.

The United States statement was intended as a polite warning that Washington did not want any part of the projects for North Vietnam or Vietcong to be financed from general resources of the Children's Fund. The United States contributed resources.

NEW YORK TIMES
19 May 1974

U.S. Admits Rain-Making, 1967 to 1972, in Indochina

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 18—The Defense Department has acknowledged to Congress that the Air Force and Navy participated in extensive rainmaking operations in Southeast Asia from 1967 to 1972 in an attempt to slow the movement of North Vietnamese troops and supplies through the Ho Chi Minh trail network.

Testimony made public today showed a considerable disagreement within the Pentagon about the military value of the top-secret rain-making effort.

The testimony also revealed that former Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird has apologized to Congress for having categorically denied two years ago that rain-making efforts had been going on. Pleading ignorance of the operation, Mr. Laird said that he had "never approved" it and that he had understood that it had not taken place under former President Lyndon B. Johnson.

A First in Warfare

The cloud-seeding program, which Defense officials said increased local rainfalls up to 30 per cent was the first known use of weather warfare in military history.

The Pentagon's admission came during a top-secret hearing last March 20 before the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on the oceans and international environment.

Dennis J. Doolin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Lieut. Col. Ed Soyster of the Army, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the subcommittee that 2,602 cloud-seeding missions were flown

from an Air Force base in Thailand, dropping a total of 47,409 canisters of rain-producing silver iodide or lead iodide over North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, beginning on March 20, 1967.

The rain-making reached a peak in 1971, according to Pentagon statistics made available to the committee, with more than 11,000 canisters dumped. Well-informed sources have told the New York Times that the operations at that point were tightly controlled by Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser for national security.

"This kind of thing was a bomb, and Henry restricted information about it to those who had to know," a former Government official said.

In his testimony, Mr. Doolin defended the program by noting that, "If an adversary wanted to stop me from getting from point A to point B, I would rather he stopped me with a rainstorm than stopped me with a bunch of bombs."

"Frankly," he added, "I view this in that context as really quite humane, if it works."

The testimony revealed that the cloud-seeding was halted on July 5, 1972, two days after The Times published a lengthy article about the highly classified operation. Defense officials denied at the time that any rain-making had been attempted over North Vietnam.

In a January, 1974, letter made public by the subcommittee, former Defense Secretary Laird apologized for his categorical denial in 1972. "I have just been informed," Mr. Laird wrote, "that such activities were conducted over North Vietnam in 1967 and again in 1968."

In his testimony, Colonel Soyster of the Joint Chiefs told the committee that the Pentagon had authorized cloud-seed-

ing over North Vietnam on July 11, 1967. The program there was terminated on Nov. 1, 1968, the colonel said, when a bombing halt was announced by President Johnson.

Dispute Over the Effect

The colonel estimated the annual cost of the cloud-seeding operations at \$3.6-million, and said it began with a series of tests in 1966 in the Laos panhandle that had been authorized by the Pentagon's Research and Engineering office. Later, Colonel Soyster said, Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp Jr., then Commander in Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, concluded that rain-making "could be used as a valuable tactical weapon."

There was some dispute between Mr. Doolin and Colonel Soyster about the efficacy of the program, which was highly classified throughout the Government because, Mr. Doolin acknowledged, of its sensitivity.

The colonel told the committee that the Defense Intelligence Agency had estimated "that rainfall was increased in limited areas up to 30 per cent above the predicted for the existing conditions—sensor recordings and other information following seeding indicated enemy difficulties from heavy rainfall."

To buttress that view, he presented charts that showed significant drops in enemy troop and supply movement in eastern Laos during two weeks in June, 1971. During one of those weeks, the colonel said, there was a typhoon in the area; in the other, he said, "we were most active with seeding activities."

Asked for his assessment, Mr. Doolin suggested that he did not share the military's enthusiasm for the rain-making program. "When you look at the amount of rainfall that was in these given areas anyway," he said, "and what was

added to it possibly by these extra seedings, it looks to me like you are getting 21 inches in a given area and we add two inches."

"If I was on the bottom," the Pentagon official added, "I do not think I would know the difference between 21 and 23." Colonel Soyster insisted that rainfall was increased, but added that the Pentagon was unable to learn how much.

Civilian Scientists Skeptical

Mr. Doolin, who has been a Pentagon official since 1969 and served with the Central Intelligence Agency previously, told the committee that despite his high position he did not learn of the secret rain-making until the columnist Jack Anderson wrote about it in March of 1971.

"I made inquiries at the time—simply for my own edification," he testified, "to find out if the rain that was artificially generated in a given area would deprive a friendly country also in the area of rain. For example, were we denying water to Thai rice paddies? I was told no, that was not the case, that there was so much moisture in the air that you could not reduce the amount really in another area; and not to pursue the matter."

Nonmilitary scientists have been far more skeptical, however, about the possible consequences of cloud-seeding, a debate that led Senator Claiborne Pell, Democrat of Rhode Island and the chairman of the subcommittee, to begin investigating the issue in 1972.

Dr. Matthew McElson, a professor of biology at Harvard and a former Government consultant, was quoted in Science magazine in 1972 as warning that "It is obvious that weather modification used as a weapon of war has the potential for causing large-scale and quite possibly uncontrollable and unpredictable destruction."

LOS ANGELES TIMES
26 May 1974

Hanoi Increases Its 'Nibbles' in South Vietnam

By GEORGE McARTHUR
Times Staff Writer

SAIGON—With embarrassing frequency of late, South Vietnam's urban military spokesman, Lt. Col. Le Trung Hien, has been announcing the loss of this or that outpost—the impression usually being given of brave defend-

ers succumbing to great odds.

The announcements are usually coupled with outrage at yet another Communist violation of the Paris cease-fire agreement. It is not advertised that the defenders sometimes pulled up stakes on their own when they realized

that help was unlikely to appear.

And since the official government policy is to defend every inch of sacred soil, the communiques have not reflected the frequent high command judgment that the cost was simply getting too high—as took place in April when the men at

Tong Le Chan pulled out without much fight after previously holding the post for 16 months.

When the cease-fire was signed the South Vietnamese held 30 more or less "major" outposts strung through the sparsely inhabited mountains and jungles along the Laotian and Cambodian borders. While

the Americans were in Vietnam—or at least while U.S. air support was available — these spots were tenable, if vulnerable. Serious assaults brought everything from B-52s to gunships spewing staggering sprays of ammunition. Helicopters flew in food and ammunition and flew out the wounded. Embattled outposts knew they were part of a big show. Nowadays the South Vietnamese air force is on lean ammunition and fuel rations and is almost fully extended. The high command is loath to risk helicopters over jungles hiding Soviet-built heat-seeking missiles. An outpost under attack can be largely on its own, particularly if the weather is bad. The isolated soldiers out there have gotten that word. About half of the border outposts, have fallen or been abandoned under pressure (often exaggerated) in the last year-and-a-half.

Yet the cumulative loss of isolated posts and God-forsaken hilltops is giving rise to apprehension that the military men in Hanoi are now preparing one more massive assault on South Vietnam. This apprehension has been fueled by reasonably accurate but hardly conclusive assessments of increased North Vietnamese strength. ("They are now sending men down, not hardware," one knowledgeable analyst said. "And some of their units are up to 90% strength and some actually overstrength. That type thing just hasn't happened before.")

The creeping advance on outposts is currently lapping at the garrison town of Ben Cat, a whistle-stop district capital some 25 miles above Saigon on what newsmen long ago loosely tabbed as an "invasion corridor."

This is because Ben Cat roughly guards an area where jungle and rubber plantation country opens on the populated farmlands which Saigon must defend; and the Saigon command is now calling in regular battalions from three nearby divisions to do so. They are not the best troops in the world but they will surely suffice, holding the North Vietnamese to relatively minor victories on the battlefield.

The North Vietnamese, having shown their muscle and created several thousand refugees to further erode the South Vietnamese economy, have probably already accomplished what they set out to do—though they may continue to grind away if the price is right.

The thinking of some really hard-nosed officials in Saigon is that Hanoi is once again giving the screw another turn and stepping up the salami tactics which have proved effective. While infiltration has increased—thus strengthening Hanoi's ability to opt for an ultimate massive offensive — the alarm bells have not yet called the Pentagon or Saigon's Joint General Staff to man the walls.

That being said, it should quickly be added that there is plenty of cause for alarm in South Vietnam. The presence of about 300,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops hardly makes for a rosy picture.

The picture could be painted in even starker terms if officials desired (for instance, there are reliable reports that the North Vietnamese are cleaning out their hospitals in border and forward areas, one sign they may soon be expecting more fighting and a new flow of casualties). But the South Vietnamese are torn between conflicting desires: One day they cry wolf—hoping for more congressional dollars — and the next day they extol the tranquility of the countryside — hoping to attract foreign investment.

The fighting that has been going on almost never gets full treatment in military communiques. Officials have privately admitted that Saigon's communiques are doctored to preclude accusations of cease-fire violations. It can hardly be doubted that the North Vietnamese do precisely the same thing.

Meanwhile, the hordes of newsmen once covering South Vietnam largely departed with the American

troops. Furthermore the Saigon government discourages battle coverage. In addition, the old easy American helicopter transportation is no longer present.

All this means detailed knowledge of the fighting is now known to fewer and fewer people who are more and more reluctant to speak candidly.

An example of this took place early this month when the South Vietnamese announced the fall of Dak Pek, a Central Highlands outpost once inhabited by American Green Berets. The announcement said something like 6,000 North Vietnamese with tank support had overrun the 7th Border Ranger Battalion holding Dak Pek. Other military officers later admitted, however, that the Rangers had practically walked off Dak Pek without a fight—this despite recent supply missions that had built up the camp with more than a month's supply of food and ammunition—most of which is now in the hands of Hanoi's soldiers.

The troops who abandoned Dak Pek—and other camps for which the fighting has been less than spirited — were renamed Border Rangers when they were incorporated into the South Vietnamese army more than two years ago. Before that they were officially called CIDG's, for Civilian Irregular Defense Forces. Popularly they were called mercenaries and were almost all ethnic Cambodians or Montagnard tribesmen recruited in the old days by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (they preferred American leadership and pay to South Vietnam's draft).

Such ethnic troops have been taking disproportionate casualties in recent months, though Saigon gives no breakdowns — and have less and less stomach for defending questionable outposts.

Similarly, South Vietnamese Regional and Popular Force militia have probably been taking most of the casualties in the isolated skirmishes that have always marked the Vietnam conflict (overall casualties have been estimated at

about 6,000 monthly).

So far as the communiques and the reported fighting reflect the situation, the high command appears to have been saving the regular troops in expectation of serious fighting later. On the other hand some major operations have gone virtually unreported, particularly an aggressive sweep in the swamps and ripa patches of the western Mekong Delta where South Vietnamese troops are credited by American observers with having inflicted debilitating losses on the once crack North Vietnamese 1st Division.

American strategists believe Hanoi's generals give the South Vietnamese soldier higher marks than he often gets in Western circles. That is given as one reason Hanoi continues to prefer salami slices rather than the big bite—which may still come later.

WASHINGTON POST
25 May 1974

China Tells U.S. Marine Unit to Leave

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States will withdraw the six-man Marine guard unit from the American liaison office in Peking at the insistence of China, the State Department acknowledged yesterday.

State Department officials sought to minimize the withdrawal of the U.S. Marines as a minor matter. Other China specialists, however, saw the demand for the Marines' recall as the most open, but still subtle, sign of Chinese displeasure with the United States since the two nations ended a generation of hostility with President Nixon's visit to Peking in February 1972.

China complained that the Marines were "the only recognizable foreign military unit in the People's Republic of China," State Department spokesman John F. King said. The six Marines are to be replaced by the end of May with four State Department civilian security men.

"This is a subject we have discussed with the Chinese on several occasions during the past year," since the liaison office in Peking was opened by Ambassador David K. E. Bruce, the spokesman said.

"Several weeks ago," King said, China made a specific request to Bruce to withdraw the Marines and "we are acquiescing to their wishes."

The spokesman said he understood that the Marines initially were assigned to China "as a pro forma matter," because the Marines traditionally are used as guards at many American diplomatic missions overseas. The Marine guards wore civilian clothes rather than uniforms, except on rare ceremonial occasions.

King said the United States considers the present state of its relations with China to be "satisfactory" and unaffected by the Marine issue.

Other sources acknowledged, however, that when the Marines were dispatched to Peking some American specialists on China questioned the propriety of the assignment, noting that U.S. Marines in China, especially in

the eyes of Communists, evoke bitter memories of foreign infringement on the country's sovereignty.

The controlling viewpoint inside the Nixon administration was said to be that the new U.S.-Chinese relationship would transcend such recollections of the past.

China, however, is experiencing a continuing ferment of reaction against all symbols of foreign and pre-revolutionary influences.

One of the questions puzzling foreign specialists is whether Premier Chou En-Lai, China's architect of detente with the United States, is himself a target in this campaign.

One independent American specialist on China said yesterday that he interprets the ouster of the U.S. Marine guards as the latest example of Peking's "little pinpricks indicating a lack of complete satisfaction with its relation-

ship with the United States."

Other experts on China have listed as examples of Peking's displeasure the recent assignment of a prominent U.S. diplomat, Leonard Unger, as new U.S. ambassador to Taiwan; the opening of additional consulates for Taiwan in the United States, and the slowness of the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan.

Peking officials are reported to have indicated to foreign visitors that they are disappointed that the expectations raised by the American-Chinese communique that climaxed President Nixon's 1972 visit have not been fulfilled. U.S.-China trade has soared to the \$1 billion level, but the pace of generally expanding relations has been slackening recently.

The six-man Marine guard unit in Peking was described as highly popular with Westerners there, and evidently

too much in evidence to please Peking's austere officials. Some months ago, at Chinese request, the Marines closed down their most celebrated attraction, a lounge in the Marines' quarters known as "The Red Ass Saloon."

Spokesman King said at his news briefing that "as far as we are concerned, the conduct of the Marines throughout has been above reproach. I never heard of the Red Ass Saloon."

There is no U.S. intention whatever, the spokesman said, to ask for any equivalent changes in the personnel or procedure at the Chinese Liaison Office in Washington, because of the recall of the Marines. The United States has about 30 personnel at its mission in Peking. China has 27 officials and 30 support personnel in Washington.

NEW YORK TIMES

25 May 1974

Thailand's Role in Asia

To Improve Relations With Neighbors Bangkok May Loosen Its Ties With U.S.

By JAMES M. MARKHAM

Special to The New York Times

BANGKOK, Thailand, May 24 — A far-reaching foreign-policy debate here is questioning some fundamental assumptions. At issue is Thailand's future place in Asia. In keeping with a long and successful

News
Analysis

tradition of self-interest, few of the Thais involved in the debate are suggesting bold opening moves. But with a full-blown democratic order expected toward the end of this year, the discussion is likely to leave the tranquil corridors of the Foreign Office and enter the streets.

A central figure in the debate is Thanat Khoman, a controversial former Foreign Minister who presided over the American build-up in Thailand in the nineteen-sixties but who now wants the Americans out. "In the past," argued Mr. Thanat, sitting on the veranda of his pleasant residence recently, "there were pluses for us from the U.S. military association. But now the minuses are beginning to show up."

Mr. Thanat maintains that the experience of the Vietnam war and recent Congressional assertiveness rule out the chance that the American air bases here would ever be used to defend Thailand from invasion.

U.S. Interests Only

"So the bases serve only American national interests, not Thailand's interests," he said.

In fact, he continued, the bases are an impediment to improved relations with China and, particularly, North Vietnam—which, in theory, could again be pounded by Thai-based B-52's if Hanoi launched an all-out offensive in South Vietnam.

In pursuit of better relations with China and North Vietnam, Mr. Thanat is tempted by the notion of somehow trading off the bases for an end to Communist support of the spreading Thai insurgencies.

Mr. Thanat, who is a member of the interim National Assembly and an adviser to Premier Sanya Dharmasakti, does not represent the Thai establishment, which tends to be more cautious in its conclusions if not in its analysis.

But his thinking aloud reaches well beyond his veranda and finds receptive listeners in academic and professional circles and among younger members of the Foreign Office—who all have gained in importance since the ouster of the military regime of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn in October.

King's Tactics Recalled

Ultimately, this younger generation would like to protect Thailand's national interests in the fashion of the 19th-century and early 20th-century kings—balancing off the superpowers against each other.

The problem is how to ease the Americans out of Thailand without creating a void that a

The current Government position, as expressed by Deputy Foreign Minister Chatichai Choonhavan in an interview, is that American forces will be withdrawn from Thailand in keeping with the over-all situation in Indochina.

General Chatichai noted that North Vietnamese troops were still stationed in neighboring Laos and Cambodia. He did not mention South Vietnam, implying that Bangkok was far more concerned about her own borders than about the Vietnamese civil war.

Assurance of Kissinger

"I met with Kissinger," General Chatichai said, "and Kissinger told me it was up to Thailand—If you want us to stay, we stay; if you want us to go, we go."

Already, Washington and Bangkok have announced plans to reduce the number of American troops here from the 34,500 level to about 27,000 by December. At the peak of the American build-up, in 1969, there were 48,000 American troops here.

The Government states that eventually all American troops and planes will be withdrawn, but neither the Thais nor the Americans seem eager to start talking about a date.

For one thing, the bases pump about \$175-million a year into the Thai economy. While this is not a critical factor in the booming gross national product—\$7.5-billion—the economies of several provincial towns would be shaken by an abrupt pullout.

The Thais, who were once convinced that the United States would "win" in Vietnam, are now talking about "de-emphasizing" the military side of their relationship with Washington.

In the meantime, Bangkok has been moving steadily to

General Chatichai calls "our Chinese friends in Peking"—possibly to distinguish them from the Chinese in Taiwan, with whom Thailand has full diplomatic relations.

The customary Ping-Pong and badminton teams have been exchanged and fairly soon the Thai National Assembly is expected to agree to revoke a long-standing decree that bans trade with Peking. The decree has already been partly breached by a Chinese agreement to sell badly needed diesel fuel to Thailand.

Although the powerful Chinese community here is well assimilated by Southeast Asian standards, some Thais remain suspicious of its ultimate loyalties, which makes the question of diplomatic relations a distant one.

Bangkok has diplomatic ties with Moscow, which have begun to warm with discussions of cultural exchanges. Recently, Thailand and Mongolia established diplomatic relations.

Interest in Hanoi Talks

Reflecting the changed domestic and international climate, the Government also has been calling for a dialogue with North Vietnam. Last month, a North Korean trade delegation was entertained in Bangkok. This was widely read as a signal to Hanoi that Thailand had no qualms about dealing with the Communists parts of divided nations.

Then, after Thailand and South Vietnam became embroiled in a controversy over fishing rights, Hanoi tentatively responded to Bangkok's repeated appeals for a dialogue.

A lengthy commentary in the North Vietnamese party newspaper Nhan Dan was softer than the usual attacks on the Thai Government. It said that if Bangkok "really wishes for friendly relations" it must "stop its confusion with the United

States in opposing the Vietnamese people."

In the past, North Vietnam had made the removal of American air bases the precondition for starting a dialogue. The Nhan Dan article, while routinely denouncing the bases, did not lay down this specific condition.

Bangkok welcomed the Nhan Dan overture, but it remains

to be seen where the dialogue can go from here.

Some Thais Skeptical

Not a few Thais are skeptical about Mr. Thanat's notion of trading off the bases for withdrawal of Hanoi's support for the insurgencies that smolder in North, northeast and southern Thailand. "I don't think it would work," said one well-placed official. "Do you?"

"Regardless of how or why it started," observed one diplomat who follows the issue, "the insurgency has grown from a small Sino-Thai-based movement to one having 7,000 people under arms, and even more cadres running around. This sort of thing just can't be turned off."

But, having watched President Nixon go to Peking, the Thais are expected to keep

pressing for openings to neighbors once considered irreconcilable enemies. And, if the new civilian order in Bangkok is not abruptly replaced by a military one, "Thailand's search for a more comfortable place in Southeast Asia—without heavy American protection—will probably continue apace."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
22 May 1974

South Korea's new troubles

By Elizabeth Pond

Seoul

South Korea's unhappy history is repeating itself in the view of some Westerners with long experience in East Asia.

These observers see South Korea President Park as making the same mistake as the rigid autocrat Syngman Rhee — whom South Korean students toppled in 1960. And they see Mr. Park as reliving the Japanese imperial authoritarianism of the '30's. This is a tragedy, they say, that could fatally weaken South Korea's defense against the North and ultimately threaten stability on the Korean peninsula.

The Westerners who hold this view ask not to be identified. And they voice their view with reluctance. Over many years they have believed in the Koreans, and they have believed that America's sacrifice of blood and treasure in the Korean war for the sake of freedom in the South was worth the cost.

Now these men point to several bitter ironies in Mr. Park's present position.

One irony is that the President — who received his training from the Japanese and was an officer in the Japanese Imperial Army—still has the old Japanese military mentality. Yet today's Japanese have left this approach so far behind them that they no longer understand Mr. Park. They are bewildered by his repeated willingness to strain Korean-Japanese relations just for the sake of suppressing domestic dissent.

A second irony is that President Park, who stands as South Korea's champion against communism, was himself condemned to death by the South Korean government in 1948 for taking part in a pro-Communist officers' revolt. His brother actually was executed by the government as a Communist. And his own life was saved only by the intervention of the Americans, who were trying desperately to keep their ally Mr. Rhee from killing off his opponents and driving the moderate middle class into the arms of the Communists. Americans familiar with the incident confirm that Mr. Park did in fact take part in the pro-Communist uprising.

Yet now President Park — with no appreciation of his own reprieve — "calls anyone who opposes the government a Communist," according to one Western observer here. He has

even decreed a possible death sentence for students demonstrating against his administration.

This labeling of dissidents as Communists leads to some curious results. The director of the Korean CIA has publicly charged that Christian students who demonstrated against the government a month ago were Communist led. And privately investigators have indicated to some Christian clergy now in jail that they too would be charged with pro-Communist activity.

Such a charge is totally discounted by both American and Japanese observers in the case of Korean Christians. When Korea was divided hundreds of thousands of Christians fled the North to escape communism, and for a quarter of a century the Christian church has been a bulwark of anticommunism in the South.

In fact, those Christians who have been protesting Mr. Park's strongman-rule consider themselves the true defenders of the nation against communism. They argue that South Koreans will rally to protect their country against any new attack from the North only so long as there is freedom in the South, and a lifestyle that is worth fighting for. They view Mr. Park's present political repression as helping the Communists by establishing the same kind of dictatorship in the South that exists in the North — thus blurring the choice between the two.

Recently a number of South Koreans have begun asking what the difference is between left totalitarianism and right totalitarianism. "This is a big topic of conversation now," one Western observer noted.

Some South Koreans have even begun recalling the 1948 officers' revolt and asking — sotto voce — if Mr. Park really is in league with the Communists and is doing what will help them the most. Similarly, some are asking why North Korea was so helpful to Mr. Park in sinking one South Korean fishing boat and seizing another just when Mr. Park was claiming a North Korean threat as the justification for jailing political dissidents in the South.

American observers do not credit any linkage between Mr. Park and the North. But they point out that some South Koreans are beginning to ask questions about such a linkage — and

to ask Americans what good it did them to save Mr. Park's life 26 years ago. Westerners point out too the analogy of the Japanese occupation of China in the 1930's. That occupation took place in the name of fighting communism — but it was the one thing that turned the Chinese people to communism.

Western observers do see one ray of hope for stability on the peninsula (though not for democracy in the South). They say North Korea has repeatedly conducted such a bellicose policy, that it has always been so bellicose, that it has ensured that Southerners would hate and fear Pyongyang more than the Seoul government. Westerners therefore hope that Pyongyang will again bungle its new opportunity in the South.

Miss Pond is the Monitor's staff correspondent in Tokyo.

WASHINGTON POST

24 May 1974

Last Thai Soldiers Leave Laos

VIENTIANE — Thailand

has withdrawn its last remaining mercenary troops from Laos, ending more than 10 years of direct Thai military involvement in this country, diplomatic sources said yesterday.

The Thai soldiers were flown out Wednesday from the former CIA-supported base at Long Cheng in northern Laos, the sources said.

At the height of the fighting in Laos several years ago, there were about 22,000 Thai soldiers here fighting on behalf of the royal Lao government.

The pullout came as the Laotian coalition government warned foreign nations with troops still on Laotian soil to respect the June 4 deadline set for their withdrawal in the country's recent peace accords.

[American pilots and military advisers are scheduled to leave Laos by June 3, Pentagon sources said. The number departing was not immediately available, they said.]

North Vietnam is reported to have more than 40,000 troops on Laotian soil, mostly along the Ho Chi

Western Hemisphere

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
29 May 1974

Many OAS nations ready to welcome Cuba

By the Associated Press

Buenos Aires

Cuba's long political and economic exclusion from the Latin-American family of nations may be coming to an end.

An Associated Press sampling has found that a majority of the members of the Organization of American States (OAS) might welcome the Communist Island nation back into the fold.

Cuba was expelled from the OAS in 1962, and a series of economic and political sanctions were applied against Fidel Castro's government, then in power for three years.

"Cuba's isolation is inadmissible and contrary to the best interest of the hemisphere," Argentine Foreign Minister Alberto J. Vignes said recently in Washington.

Other leaders, no longer afraid of Cuban-backed guerrillas or possible retaliation from the United States, are voicing similar feelings.

Ties strengthened

For years, Mr. Castro branded the OAS "an American puppet" and expressed no interest in rejoining the group. But recently Cuba has increased its bilateral ties with Latin-American nations.

Argentina pressed an intensive trade campaign with Cuba, extending a \$1.2 billion credit and then selling Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors cars produced in Argentina to Cuba.

There is still considerable opposition, especially from military-backed anti-Communist governments, to removing the political and economic sanctions against Cuba.

But the AP survey showed that 13 countries were inclined to review the sanction policy. Nine opposed a review but for considerably differing reasons.

Dialogue maintained

Favoring the review, Mexico, for example, has always held open a dialogue with Havana and has politely disregarded suggestions that it shouldn't. Argentina and Peru are ardent champions of a new look at Castro. English-speaking Caribbean nations are hoping to open new trade lanes. All these governments — with

the exception of Peru — have freely elected regimes.

The strongest opponents of lifting the political and economic blockade are the right-wing, military-controlled regimes.

Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay are reluctant to forget Mr. Castro's attempts to foment terrorist revolution in South America. Bolivia still recalls how the late Argentine-Cuban Ernesto (Che) Guevara attempted to topple its government in 1967. It took months of jungle fighting to stop him.

Chile, now firmest in its opposition to Cuba, claims Mr. Castro sent some 2,000 Cubans to Chile during the regime headed by Marxist President Salvador Allende.

The military junta which overthrew President Allende eight months ago says Cuba has not stopped exporting terrorism. It claims that some 14,000 antijunta radicals are waiting in Argentina to cross the Andes for the "counterrevolution." One of the Junta's first acts was to break relations with Cuba.

At a recent Washington meeting of foreign ministers of the Americas, Argentina's Mr. Vignes was asked to conduct a survey of hemispheric positions on the Cuban question.

The results will be submitted to the next foreign ministers' meeting scheduled to be held in Buenos Aires next March. Local diplomatic sources say that the consultations have not yet begun.

Here is how some Latin-American countries stand on Cuba:

Leftist activities cited

Argentina — Favors lifting the blockade and has unilaterally broken it. Argentina sent 240 top businessmen, diplomats, and economists to Havana last March and has contracted \$600 million in business over three years.

Bolivia — Gen. Hugo Banzer's military government is opposed to Cuba's reentrance to the OAS. "Cuba has not ceased encouraging extreme leftist activities against Bolivia," said a senior government spokesman.

Brazil — President Ernesto Geisel's military-supported government is opposed. Brazil has been a prominent leader of the opposition, and its position is to be "among the first of the last to relax any sanctions," according to a high government source.

Chile — Gen. Augusto Pinochet's military junta — moving from Salvador Allende's open friendship with Mr. Castro to open hostility — is opposed, being convinced that Havana is still trying to export revolution.

Trend seen

Colombia — Left-of-center President-Elect Alfonso Lopez Michelen will be inaugurated in August and is on record as saying that the present trend will result in the lifting of economic sanctions. He has not said specifically he would reestablish relations with Cuba, but the implication is that he is in favor of it.

Peru — the Peruvian military government wants normalization of relations with Cuba and strongly favors the presence of Cuban speakers at the coming Buenos Aires meeting. Cuba and Peru now are embarking on several large fishmeal and shipping construction projects.

Opposition voiced

Paraguay — President Alfredo Stroessner's anti-Communist regime is strongly opposed to lifting sanctions against Cuba.

Uruguay — the military-backed regime of President Juan M. Bordaberry is opposed to lifting restrictions.

Venezuela — Both outgoing President Rafael Caldera and incoming President Carlos Andres Perez have stated their willingness to help put an end to the sanctions.

Mexico — the only Latin-American country which refused to sever relations with Cuba. It is favorable to inviting Castro to the Buenos Aires meeting.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
23 May 1974

Chile: Moral and Political Blindness

Because of the Chilean military establishment's tradition of staying out of politics, the world was disappointed when its generals staged a violent coup last September. The Marxist government had proved an abysmal failure; the economy was in a state of near collapse; the people were so fed up with shortages and a 1,000% inflation rate that they almost certainly would have voted the Communist-Socialist coalition out in the next national election.

Inside and outside Chile, however, there was a widespread expectation that, because of their non-political tradition, the military men would behave honorably and, before long, restore the normal democratic process.

It isn't happening. The cruel reality is reflected in the statement, issued by the Roman Catholic Church in Chile, accusing the four-man military junta of creating a "climate of insecurity and fear" through torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, and dismissal of workers for political reasons.

The Committee of Cooperation for Peace in Chile, an interchurch group sponsored by the Catholic and Protestant churches and by the Jewish community, has compiled reports of hundreds of cases of torture since the junta took over. A three-member mission of the International Commission of Jurists also reported, after a visit to Chile, that political prisoners had been subjected to "various forms of ill treatment, sometimes amounting to severe torture."

Spokesmen for the generals call such reports "distortions," but large numbers of Chileans know otherwise. Almost anyone can be denounced anonymously and disappear, and relatives have no

idea as to where. Estimates of the number of political prisoners range up to 6,000. Some 38,000 people are said to have been fired from their jobs on the real or imagined ground that they supported the former Marxist government.

In some cases, those fired are people who actually supported the coup at the time it occurred; their mistake lies in criticizing the junta since then.

There is no evidence that the suspension of civil liberties is a temporary aberration that will end when the last Marxist guerrillas are rooted out.

The generals didn't stop with outlawing the Marxist parties. They suspended activity by all the political parties, including the Christian Democrats. Gen. Augusto Pinochet, junta president, recently told a gathering to "erase from your minds the idea of elections."

Christian Democratic leaders fear that their party is being put to death as a political force, that when the generals finally decide to return Chile to civilian rule, they will not call free elections but hand power over to the right-wing National Movement.

This is a horrifying situation in a country that for years had a functioning democracy, a substantial middle class, a comparatively good educational system—and no recent history of Brazilian-style military coups or political repression.

Ironically, through moral and political blindness the junta is not only creating a tragedy for the Chilean people but is also making the Marxists look better in retrospect than they have any right to look. By doing so, the generals may be paving the way for the very thing they are trying to avoid: the ultimate ascension to power of a revolutionary Marxist government.

In answer to one U.S. spokesman's unofficial comment that the subsidy probes are being initiated because of balance of payments problems, Latin America points out that these problems have nothing to do with Latin America. Actually, the U.S. has a solid \$700 million trade surplus with the area.

It all seems a sorry commentary on the current state of Latin American-United States relations. Perhaps Dr. Kissinger will be able to use some of his persuasive powers on Treasury and other branches of the administration — once he frees himself from his preoccupation with the Mideast — to get this knotty problem solved. It ought not to be too difficult to solve — to everyone's satisfaction. But if something isn't done soon by Washington to get a mutually satisfactory compromise, Latin America will have every reason to doubt Washington's sincerity in the trade arena and on the whole gamut of Latin America-United States relations.

U.S.-Latin trade warning

Latin America is troubled anew by Washington's seeming inconsistencies on trade policy. At the very moment Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger was recently promising Latin-American foreign ministers easier access to United States markets, Treasury agents were in Brazil and Colombia looking into allegations that exports from those countries receive government subsidies.

If the agents do indeed find that certain exports are so subsidized, "countervailing" duties, equivalent to the subsidy, will likely be imposed on those exports. In proceeding with its probe, Treasury has dusted off an obscure law, seldom invoked in the past apparently because the Secretary of the Treasury, using his broad discretionary powers in such matters, had decided against it. Just why the law is being invoked now is open to speculation.

What is not open to speculation, however, is Latin-America's bit-

terness over the whole matter. The immediate focus of Treasury's probe is fairly narrow: Brazil's annual export of \$81 million worth of footwear to the U.S. and Colombia's \$8 million sale of cut flowers. But there is concern throughout the hemisphere that the whole affair will widen. As if to confirm this view, there are new reports from both Washington and Buenos Aires that Treasury is about to launch a similar investigation into Argentina's \$50 million a year footwear export trade to the U.S.

The Latin Americans point out, with reason, that all nations, including the U.S., use various overt and hidden subsidies to stimulate their foreign trade. Why, they ask, should they be penalized for doing so? In the first place, if there is a special relationship between the U.S. and the nations of Latin America, as Dr. Kissinger said, why single out Latin America on the subsidy issue?